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FLINT  OF  OUTRAGE
Toni M. Massaro & Ellen Elizabeth Brooks*
Officials replaced safe water sources with contaminated water sources for tens of thousands
of people living in Flint, Michigan, from April 2014 to October 2015.  Overwhelming evidence
indicates that the officials knew the water was potentially harmful to residents’ health and prop-
erty.  This unfathomable disregard for the residents of Flint sparked national outrage and
prompted criminal charges as well as multiple civil suits.
Residents’ civil claims included two strands of substantive due process: that the actions
infringed residents’ fundamental liberty rights to bodily integrity and to state protection from
harmful acts by third parties, and that the government actions “shocked the conscience.”  The
litigants also raised equal protection arguments that government targeted the community based
on race and poverty.
This Article makes three claims.  First, it asserts that fundamental rights and equal protec-
tion arguments that challenge the denial of uncontaminated water face the serious, perhaps
insurmountable obstacles that plague any call for new or expanded constitutional rights.  Consti-
tutional law is clunky and often formalistic.  Doctrine and principles of judicial restraint here
militate against categorically elevated judicial scrutiny—which we call thick rights strategies—of
these and similar public officials’ actions.  Moreover, the thick rights strategies may entail liabil-
ity questions that are not—as yet—judicially manageable.
Second, it asserts that “shocks the conscience” arguments offer a viable alternative to a thick
rights strategy.  Properly understood, this test enforces a liberty baseline, even absent a fundamen-
tal right or suspect classification.  This thin rights test is properly reserved for worst-case scena-
rios, not for garden-variety government blunders.  Flint qualified.
Third, it argues that this constitutional baseline liberty may apply to all environmental
cases in which shocking government conduct elides established fundamental rights or suspect
classification categories.  Invoking it would not open judicial floodgates or risk undue judicial
intrusion into regulatory matters better left to other government branches.  It would maintain a
difficult-to-flunk but critical liberty limit on extreme official disregard for human wellbeing and
environmental justice.  It also would provide space for the development of a potential fundamen-
tal right to uncontaminated water while allowing public airing of the serious harms to life, the
failure of government processes, the citizen powerlessness, and the grave environmental harms
that threaten multiple communities but impose their most horrific costs on the most vulnerable
people.  The Flint tragedy offers a constitutional cautionary tale that should be noted and heeded.
© 2017 Toni M. Massaro & Ellen Elizabeth Brooks.  Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below
cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a
citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Toni M. Massaro, Regent’s Professor, Milton O. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law,
University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.  Ellen Elizabeth Brooks, N.Y.U.
School of Law, Class of 2018.  Our thanks to Kirsten Engel, Robert Glennon, Michael
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“The Flint water crisis is a story of government failure, intransigence, unpreparedness,
delay, inaction, and environmental injustice.”1
INTRODUCTION
Government officials2 in Michigan engaged in shocking acts.  In April
2014, they replaced safe public water supplied to Flint from Lake Huron with
improperly treated water supplied from the polluted Flint River.3  Contact
with certain pollutants caused leaching in the pipes, and resulted in seriously
contaminated water.  The officials did this despite evidence that the Flint
River water was unsafe,4 despite the availability of the safe Lake Huron water
source,5 and despite a City resolution to secure future safe water from a new,
alternative source as early as 2016.6  The surrounding communities—which,
unlike Flint, are predominantly white communities—continued to use the
uncontaminated Detroit water.7  Officials then intentionally concealed data
and made false statements in an attempt to downplay the health dangers
posed by using Flint’s tap water,8 and forwent treatment of the contaminated
water that allegedly would have cost only $150 per day.9  Consequently,
scores of Flint residents indisputably were exposed for eighteen months to
water with unsafe lead levels and other corrosive elements that inflicted
1 FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2016), https://www.michigan
.gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_517805_7.pdf [herein-
after FWATF FINAL REPORT].  The Flint Water Advisory Task Force (FWATF) was composed
of five members who possessed public policy, public utilities, environmental protection,
public health, and health care experience.  It was appointed by Governor Rick Snyder on
October 21, 2015, to conduct an independent review of the Flint water contamination
problem.  It issued its final report in March of 2016. Id. at 2.
2 The assignment of responsibility among the many government actors who played a
role in the crisis is likely to vex the courts tasked with responding to the many legal claims
that the crisis spawned. See infra Part I.
3 Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 21, Mays v. Snyder, 2017 WL
445637 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017) (No. 15-14002) [hereinafter Mays Complaint]; see Brie D.
Sherwin, Pride and Prejudice and Administrative Zombies: How Economic Woes, Outdated Environ-
mental Regulations, and State Exceptionalism Failed Flint, Michigan, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 653,
661 (2017) (describing chronology of events in detail); Ryan Felton, How Flint Traded Safe
Drinking Water for Cost-Cutting Plan that Didn’t Work, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/23/flint-water-crisis-cost-cutting-switch-water-supply;
Jessica Trounstine, How Racial Segregation and Political Mismanagement Led to Flint’s Shocking
Water Crisis, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/02/08/heres-the-political-history-that-led-to-flints-shocking-water-crisis/?
utm_term=.5aaf3e946dde.
4 See FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 23–26.
5 See id. at 27 n.34.
6 See id. at 41 n.54.
7 See Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 44–45.
8 Id. at 16, 19.
9 See Holly Fournier, Snyder: “Career Bureaucrats” to Blame for Flint Crisis, DET. NEWS
(Apr. 11, 2016), http://detne.ws/1N47y0a.
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health and property damage.10  Indeed, the problems persisted into late
2016 when a federal district judge concluded residents were still drinking
contaminated water and ordered government officials to immediately pro-
vide them with a minimum of ninety-six half-liter bottles of water per week
and offer instructions in multiple languages regarding the lead levels of city
water and how to install filters.11
These actions prompted criminal charges12 and civil lawsuits13 that
alleged, inter alia, that the government actions violated Flint residents’ sub-
stantive due process and equal protection rights.  Plaintiffs sought an order
declaring that defendants’ conduct was unconstitutional, as well as injunctive
relief, monetary damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.14  This Arti-
cle addresses the constitutional claims raised against Michigan and various
state actors in Mays v. Snyder,15 and shows why the Flint nightmare illumi-
nated both the strengths and many weaknesses of constitutional law as
applied to complex cases like this one.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to constitu-
tionalize affirmative rights to basic human needs such as food, medical care,
10 See Mark Guarino, New Crisis for Flint Residents: Cost of Home Damage Caused by City
Water, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2016), http://wapo.st/1Qq6Z0w?tid=ss_mail. Property damage
included the cost of replacing water heaters, pipes, and some water service lines to homes.
Id.
11 See Niraj Chokshi, Judge Orders that Bottled Water Be Delivered to Residents of Flint, Mich.,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/flint-michigan-
water-ruling.html?mwrsm=Email.
12 See Felony Complaint, State v. Rosenthal, No. 16TA-168SFY (Mich. Dist. Ct. July 29,
2016); Scott Atkinson & Monica Davey, 5 Charged with Involuntary Manslaughter in Flint
Water Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/us/
flint-water-crisis-manslaughter.html?emc=edit_ne_20170614&nl=evening-briefing&nlid=33
605667&te=1&_r=0&referer=; Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, 2 Former Flint Emergency Man-
agers Charged over Tainted Water, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/12/20/us/flint-water-charges.html?emc=eta1; Breanna Edwards, 6 Mich. State Employ-
ees Facing Criminal Charges in Flint Water Crisis, THE ROOT (July 29, 2016), http://www.ther-
oot.com/articles/news/2016/07/6-mich-state-employees-facing-criminal-charges-in-flint-
water-crisis/; Eliott C. McLaughlin & Catherine E. Shoichet, Charges Against 3 in Flint Water
Crisis “Only the Beginning,” CNN (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/20/
health/flint-water-crisis-charges/.
13 See, e.g., Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 1; see also Justin Cosgrove, Michigan Judge
Allows Lawsuit over Water Crisis, JURIST: PAPER CHASE (Oct. 28, 2016) (reporting on devel-
opments and describing various pending lawsuits); Chad Halcom, Flint Water Lawsuits Flood
In, CRAIN’S DET. BUS. (Feb. 7, 2016), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20160207/
NEWS/302079983/flint-water-lawsuits-flood-in (describing pending lawsuits).
14 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 57.
15 Mays v. Snyder, No. 15-14002, 2017 WL 445637, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2017).  The federal trial
judge determined that the federal constitutional claims were preempted by the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act and then dismissed the federal statutory claims on the ground that the sixty-
day notice requirement of the Act was not met.  For virtually identical claims brought in
the Michigan Court of Claims, see Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017, at 1–2 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct.
26, 2016).
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education, and housing.16  Constitutionalizing a right to clean water thus
would be audacious.  Knowing this, plaintiffs asserted ostensibly more
restricted liberties: a right to bodily integrity and a right to freedom from
third-party harms that were violated when the government knowingly fun-
neled untreated, harmful water to them.17
But even these narrower claims are quaky and would have wide implica-
tions, given the prevalence of contaminants in water supplies in the United
States, and the complexities of setting water quality standards.  Courts thus
may be chary of imposing elevated scrutiny on government decisions in this
area of environmental law.
The “shocks the conscience” due process test likewise faced obstacles.
The test is rarely satisfied and often critiqued for its subjectivity.18  Courts are
loath to second-guess official decisions based on this amorphous standard.
Finally, the equal protection claims were doctrinally fragile.  The fateful
government decisions involved a common public water source of an entire
town.  Multiple actors—not one with a clear, coherent, and hostile intent to
harm all Flint residents—contributed to the water contamination crisis.
Courts may be reluctant to confer suspect class treatment on “all residents”
even though the community is poor, politically vulnerable, and predomi-
nantly composed of racial minorities.
And yet, the Flint water crisis was outrageous.  Clean water is a basic
human need.  Flint water was grossly contaminated.  This was a man-made
disaster that could have been avoided with a minimum of foresight and at
relatively little expense.19  Flint residents had no meaningful political power
over the fateful decisions.20
Not all outrageous government acts violate the Constitution, but the
ones at stake in the Flint crisis did.  That everything was wrong in Flint should
not have meant that nothing was, as a matter of constitutional law.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the facts surrounding
the Flint water crisis.  Part II describes the due process and equal protection
theories advanced by the plaintiffs in Mays, and the state actors’ responses to
16 See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203–04 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The
modern expansion of government has led to proposals for reinterpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment to guarantee the provision of basic services such as education, poor relief,
and, presumably, police protection . . . . The Supreme Court has refused to go so
far . . . .”).
17 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 1.
18 See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13
CHAP. L. REV. 307 (2010); Matthew D. Umhofer, Confusing Pursuits: Sacramento v. Lewis
and the Future of Substantive Due Process in the Executive Setting, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 437,
450 (2001) (arguing that the test “provides no more protection from government miscon-
duct to people at large than convicted criminals in the midst of a prison riot” and that
“[s]uch a result is difficult to defend”).
19 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
20 See id. (“The Flint Water crisis occurred when state-appointed emergency managers
replaced local representative decision-making in Flint, removing . . . public accountability
that come[s] with public decision-making.”).
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them.  Part III analyzes the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection theo-
ries, and outlines the virtues and weaknesses of each of them.  It concludes
that “thick rights” theories—ones that involve fundamental rights and sus-
pect classifications—were not the best claims in this case.  However, it main-
tains that government officials should have been held accountable under the
“thin right” theory that their conduct shocked the conscience in particularly
egregious, unconstitutional ways.  Part IV discusses the wider implications of
the shocks the conscience test for future cases in which poverty, race, and
government ineptitude impose disproportionate environmental harms on
vulnerable communities.
I. FAILING FLINT
Flint is a failing city.  It suffers from a declining population, pervasive
poverty, and very poor quality of life.  In 1960, the population was over
200,000.21  Today, fewer than 100,000 people reside there.22  Over 40% of
the population lives below the federal poverty line.23  Crime rates are high.24
Statistics that measure overall health are low.25  Economic prospects are
bleak.26  And its multifaceted misery has a stark, racially disparate impact:
over 50% of Flint residents are African American.27
Flint’s state and municipal stewards failed its residents in multiple ways.
The failures were so glaring that the State took over emergency management
of the city in 2011.28  Yet these managers, too, failed Flint.  The water crisis is
a particularly sickening—in every sense—example of all of these failures.
A. Water Supply History
The City purchased its water system from a private owner in 1903.29  In
1965, it contracted with the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department
(DWSD) to provide its water.30  Water provided by DWSD was properly
treated for corrosion control.31
The City also kept an emergency backup—the Flint Water Treatment
Plant (FWTP)—to that water supply.  The FWTP drew water from the Flint
River, and was operated only four times each year to maintain its readiness.32
21 Id. at 15.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. For a compelling report on the difficulties Flint law enforcement officials face,
see Zackary Canepari & Drea Cooper, Policing Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/opinion/policing-flint.html.
25 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 15.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 39.
29 Id. at 15.
30 Id. at 16.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 15.
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In 2000, Flint’s thirty-five-year contract with DWSD expired.  It was there-
after renewed annually, subject to termination by either party.33  Charges
began to spike, with an average annual increase of over six percent.34  The
escalating cost of water aggravated Flint’s already dire economic situation.  In
an effort to mitigate water costs,35 or perhaps in an effort to stimulate the
local economy with a new public works project,36 the City looked for an alter-
native supply.  It did so under the direction of its emergency managers.37
Michigan has an Emergency Manager Law,38 which divests locally
elected officials of decisionmaking power and places a state-appointed emer-
gency manager in charge.  The law is triggered when, as was true in Flint, a
municipality is in dire financial straits.39  The emergency manager assumes
the responsibilities of elected officials for the city and has dramatic powers
over past, present, and future city contracts.40
33 Id. at 16.
34 Id.
35 This was disputed.  Some sources suggest DWSD cut off Flint from its water supply
and refused to negotiate a cheaper price.  Others suggest DWSD offered a competitive deal
that was refused in favor of reviving FWTP. See Shikha Dalmia, The Flint Water Crisis Is the
Result of a Stimulus Project Gone Wrong, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Jan. 25, 2016, 4:33 PM),
http://reason.com/blog/2016/01/25/the-flint-water-crisis-is-the-result-of.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1541–75 (2012).  As of the end of April, 2015, the City of
Flint moved from being under the control of an emergency manager to home rule order
under the guidance of a Receivership Transition Advisory Board (RTAB).  This board
maintains the measures prescribed upon the emergency manager’s exit.  The Mayor and
City Council have resumed their defined roles with regard to City business, yet major finan-
cial and policy decisions will be reviewed by the RTAB to ensure that they maintain fiscal
and organizational stability as directed under Public Act 436. See Receivership Transition
Advisory Board (RTAB), CITY OF FLINT, https://www.cityofflint.com/rtab/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2017).
39 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1541–75.
40 See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State
Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 581 (2012).  Anderson described
the law as a form of “democratic dissolution.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In
other words, “changes that suspend local democracy, even though the city remains a legal
entity.  For an unbounded period of time, a city’s corporate status is held in place while its
charter and system of government are replaced by a single official acting with unprece-
dented . . . discretion.” Id.  As Anderson noted in 2012:
The impact of the law has disproportionately impacted the state’s African-Ameri-
can population.  The four cities already approved for intervention have propor-
tionately large African-American populations: Benton Harbor is 91.4% African-
American, Flint is 59.5%, Pontiac is 55.3%, and Ecorse is 48.6%.  The press has
widely and accurately reported that close to half of the state’s African-American
population will be governed by an emergency manager if Detroit is approved for
state intervention, as threatened. . . . The cities selected for intervention are also
very high poverty, with poverty rates ranging from a low of 32% in Pontiac to a
high of 48.7% in Benton Harbor (compared to a 13.8% national average).  Oppo-
sition to the law thus emphasizes that the displacement of elected local govern-
ments by emergency managers is taking place in poor and minority cities.
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The appointment of an emergency manager complicates the assignment
of accountability for key decisions and also raises serious questions of demo-
cratic authority.  Not only were Flint residents given contaminated water, but
they also had no real political say in the matter.
B. From DWSD to FWTP
In April of 2013, the City Council voted to approve the Flint emergency
manager’s decision to join the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA) instead
of DWSD.41  KWA was created to provide a water supply pipeline from Lake
Huron.42  The City’s decision to use KWA prompted DWSD to provide notice
of intent to end its contract with Flint in April 2014.43
The City of Flint and the City of Detroit, which were both under emer-
gency management control during this time, could not agree on means of
providing water service to Flint after April 2014 until KWA was fully opera-
tional.44  Flint thus began using its emergency back-up water supplier, FWTP,
on a full-time basis.45
The switch to Flint River water was done without adequate preparation
of staff, proper testing of the water, or proper plant upgrades.46  Sampling of
the water to assure it met applicable water safety standards was done improp-
erly, leading to likely violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).47
FWTP did not properly treat the water for corrosion under the standards
outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 141.82.48  The Michigan Department of Environmen-
tal Quality (MDEQ) erroneously decided the corrosion control standards set
by the EPA Lead and Copper Rule and the Safe Drinking Water Act were not
required of FWTP until after two six-month monitoring periods elapsed.49
There were three main problems with FWTP’s initial treatment after the
switch to the Flint River supply was made.  First, they failed to treat the water
with an orthophosphate, which decreases corrosiveness and protects the nat-
Id. at 590–91 (footnotes omitted); see also Lora Krsulich, Note, Polluted Politics, 105 CALIF.
L. REV. 501, 526–28 (2017) (discussing emergency manager laws and disparate impact on
minority communities).
41 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 18; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300f–j (2012) [hereinafter SDWA].  Contrary to
requirements of the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), the Flint Utilities Department failed to
select high-risk homes for testing.  Flint also employed sampling techniques such as testing
preflushed lines and using narrow-mouthed bottles, that while “possibly technically permis-
sible,” failed to maximize the potential for detection.  FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,
at 29, 44.  These sampling techniques were implemented under the guidance of MDEQ.
Id.
48 See FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22, 23 n.25, 44.
49 Id. at 16, 18.
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ural mineral layer built over lead pipes that prevents leaching.50  Second,
they failed to properly monitor and treat the pH of the water, which
decreased from 8 in December of 2014 to the more acidic value of 7.3 in
August 2015; in comparison, the City of Boston maintains a pH of 9.6 as a
part of its corrosion control plan.51  Third, chloride based flocculants were
added to a water source that already had a high concentration of chloride,
which increased the corrosiveness of the water.52
The residents of Flint immediately complained that the FWTP water
smelled, looked, and tasted bad.53  Citizen complaints were ignored, and evi-
dence of the water contamination was dismissed.54  Even after there was no
serious doubt of the water contamination, delays in addressing the dire situa-
tion persisted.55
C. Contamination
The FWTP water was bad.  In fact, it was outrageously bad.  The contami-
nation included E. coli and “disinfection by-products.”56  Water corrosiveness
leached lead from pipes and fixtures,57 and increased the likelihood of
Legionella contamination.58
The Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), promulgated by the EPA under the
SDWA, regulates the quantity of lead in potable water.59  The LCR does not
provide a maximum contaminant level (MCL) for lead, because even minis-
cule amounts of lead in potable water are unsafe.60  The LCR sets the lead
action level, the concentration of lead at which corrective action is
required,61 at the point where more than 10% of samples collected during
50 Michael Torrice, How Lead Ended Up in Flint’s Tap Water, 94 CHEMICAL & ENGINEER-
ING NEWS 7 (2016).
51 Id.
52 Id. The ferric chloride was added to coagulate organic matter in an attempt to
reduce the levels of byproducts formed by chlorine disinfectant reacting with organic mat-
ter. Id.
53 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
54 Id. at 1.
55 Id. at 16–21.
56 Id. at 16.
57 See CHINARO KENNEDY ET AL., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, BLOOD
LEAD LEVELS AMONG CHILDREN AGED <6 YEARS—FLINT, MICHIGAN, 2013–2016 (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6525e1 (confirming elevated levels of lead in chil-
dren after the shift to the Flint River water).
58 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 24–26.
59 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.80–91 (1995); see also FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22, 49.
Michigan’s state Safe Drinking Water Act provides the state authority to regulate drinking
water and enables the EPA to delegate implementation of the federal SWDA to MDEQ, but
the EPA retains an obligation to act when a public water system fails to comply with federal
standards. Id. at 48–49.
60 Sean Monaghan, Lead in Drinking Water: Are We Looking in the Right Places?, 2016 N.J.
LAW. 42, 43 (2016).
61 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 141.80(c)85).
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any monitoring have a lead concentration exceeding 0.015 mg/L (fifteen
parts per billion—“ppb”).62
A violation of the lead action level triggers requirements to implement
applicable source water treatment, provide public education materials, and
sample tap water upon a customer’s request.63  If the concentration of lead
does not fall below the lead action level after the implementation of corro-
sion control and source water treatment, then lead service lines must be
replaced.64  Large systems serving over 50,000 people either must follow cor-
rosion control treatment steps set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 141.91(d),65 or be
deemed to have optimized corrosion control treatment under
§ 141.81(b)(2)66 or (b)(3).67
MDEQ misinterpreted the requirements of the LCR.68  It wrongly
advised that corrosion control did not need to be implemented upon com-
mencement of full-time FWTP operation.69  Rather, it advised that corrosion
control needed to be implemented only after the two six-month monitoring
periods were completed.70  Regardless of this initial mistake, the results of
the first six-month monitoring period, which placed the ninetieth percentile
lead sample at six ppb, would have disqualified the system from being
deemed optimized for corrosion control without the implementation of steps
set forth in § 141.81; yet MDEQ still failed to require the appropriate mea-
sures for Flint’s water.71  Additionally, the sampling methods Flint used likely
underestimated the lead concentration in the water.72  The City instructed
residents to pre-flush taps before collecting samples, which minimizes lead
capture in the samples.73  Although this is not explicitly prohibited in the
LCR, “it negates the intent of the rule to collect compliance samples under
62 § 141.80(c)(1).
63 § 141.80(e)–(g); Monaghan, supra note 60, at 43.
64 § 141.84(a).
65 § 141.91(d).
66 The system must demonstrate “to the satisfaction of the State that it has conducted
activities equivalent to the corrosion control steps.”  § 141.81(b)(2).
67 § 141.81(b)(3) (citing § 141.89(a)(1)(ii)).  Results of tap water and source water
monitoring must demonstrate for two consecutive six-month monitoring periods that the
difference between lead levels in tap and source water is less than the Practical Quantita-
tion Level of 0.005 mg/L.
68 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 28–29.
72 Memorandum from Miguel A. Del Toral, Regulations Manager, Ground Water and
Drinking Water Branch, EPA on High Lead Levels in Flint Michigan—Interim Report to
Thomas Poy, Chief, Ground Water and Drinking Water Branch, EPA (June 24, 2015)
[hereinafter Del Toral Memo].
73 Id.  The EPA expressed this concern to MDEQ, which “indicated that this practice is
not prohibited by the LCR and continue[d] to retain the ‘pre-flushing’ recommendation
in their lead compliance sampling guidance to public water systems in Michigan.” Id.
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‘worst-case’ conditions.”74  Flint did not properly select high-risk homes for
sampling, as required by the rule.75  The high corrosivity of the improperly
treated Flint River water caused lead to leach into potable water distributed
to residents.76  Lead is a neurotoxin and probable human carcinogen that
affects children more severely than adults;77 children may absorb 40% to
50% of orally ingested water-soluble lead, whereas adults only absorb 3% to
10%.78  Virginia Tech professor Marc Edwards’ survey of lead concentration
in Flint’s water indicated lead levels in excess of the lead action level,79 and
water samples from the home of Flint citizen Lee-Anne Walters had
extremely high lead concentrations ranging from 200 to 13,200 ppb, almost
900 times the action level of fifteen ppb.80  The proportion of children with
elevated blood lead levels increased after April 2014, when Flint switched
from DWSD to FWTP.81
Although lead service lines are no longer installed, many remain in
place in areas with older infrastructure.82  Ten to eighty percent of the Flint
water distribution system is estimated to contain lead service lines.83  Optimal
corrosion control measures are used to prevent lead and other harmful sub-
stances leaching from service lines into drinking water.  For purposes of the
LCR, the optimal corrosion control measure is defined as the “corrosion con-
trol treatment that minimizes the lead and copper concentrations at users’
taps while insuring that the treatment does not cause the water system to
violate any national primary drinking water regulations.”84  Corrosion con-
trol measures include adjusting alkalinity and pH and adding phosphate cor-
rosion inhibitors, which are chemicals containing orthophosphate.85
Phosphate corrosion inhibitors help form a passivation layer over the surface
74 Id.; cf. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR LEAD 4 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. DHHS]
(“If one is not certain whether an older building contains lead pipes, it is best to let the
water run a while before drinking it so that any lead formed in the pipes can be flushed
out.”).
75 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.
76 See id. at 16.
77 U.S. DHHS, supra note 74, at 8–10.
78 Mona Hanna-Attisha et al., Elevated Blood Lead Levels in Children Associated with the
Flint Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk and Public Health Response, 106 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 283, 284 (2016).
79 The ninetieth percentile of Edwards’ 252 Flint water samples was twenty-five ppb,
with 100 samples containing concentrations exceeding five ppb. FWATF FINAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 51. R
80 Del Toral Memo, supra note 72, at 4.  The samples also contained very high levels of
iron. Id. at 3.
81 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 32; Hanna-Attisha et al., supra note 78, at
283.
82 Hanna-Attisha et al., supra note 78, at 284.
83 Id. at 283.
84 40 C.F.R. § 141.2 (2007).
85 EPA, OPTIMAL CORROSION CONTROL TREATMENT EVALUATION TECHNICAL RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR PRIMACY AGENCIES AND PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS 25 (2016) [hereinafter EPA
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of the metal by reacting with lead to form insoluble compounds.86  The effec-
tiveness of orthophosphate depends upon factors such as the pH and ionic
strength of the solution, and the presence of other metals in the existing
corrosion scale.87  DWSD water, which is considered optimized for corrosion
control treatment, is treated with orthophosphate.88  In order to cut costs,
Flint water was not treated with an orthophosphate inhibitor.89
The Flint River water had a much higher chloride-to-sulfate mass ratio
(CSMR) than the DWSD water.90  CSMR is used to measure corrosivity to
lead.91  A high ratio represents a large concentration of chloride with respect
to sulfate compounds and leads to higher rates of lead corrosion.92  A lower
ratio is preferable because sulfates combine with lead to form an insoluble
protective layer on the inside of pipes, whereas chloride breaks down this
protective layer by forming a soluble complex with lead.93  The CSMR is posi-
tively correlated with ninetieth percentile lead concentration.94  Corrosion is
a significant concern when the CSMR exceeds 0.58.95  The CSMR of Flint
distribution system water was measured at 1.6 after the switch, as compared
to a much lower ratio of 0.45 before the switch.96
In August of 2014, E. coli and total coliform bacteria were detected in
violation of the SDWA.97  In response to the bacterial contamination, FWTP
OCCT]; Marc Edwards et al., Desktop Guidance for Mitigating Pb and Cu Corrosion By-products,
91 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 66, 74 (1999).
86 EPA OCCT, supra note 85, at 25.  The LCR defines corrosion inhibitor as “a substance
capable of reducing the corrosivity of water toward metal plumbing materials, especially
lead and copper, by forming a protective film on the interior surface of those materials.”
40 C.F.R. § 141.2.
87 EPA OCCT, supra note 85, at 25.
88 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16; see also Mark Edwards et al., RAPID:
Synergistic Impacts of Corrosive Water and Interrupted Corrosion Control on Chemical
Microbiological Water Quality: Flint at D-1 (2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/08/rapid-proposal-final.pdf.
89 Edwards et al., supra note 88, at D-1.
90 Hanna-Attisha et al., supra note 78, at 283.  The CSMR for Flint River water was 1.6,
compared to 0.45 for DWSD.  Edwards et al., supra note 88, at D-1; see also Torrice, supra
note 50.
91 Edwards et al., supra note 88, at D-1.
92 See CAROLINE NGUYEN ET AL., WATER RES. FOUND., IMPACT OF CHLORIDE: SULFATE
MASS RATIO (CSMR) CHANGES ON LEAD LEACHING IN POTABLE WATER xxix (2010), http://
www.waterrf.org/publicreportlibrary/4088.pdf.
93 Id.
94 See Marc Edwards & Simoni Triantafyllidou, Chloride-to-Sulfate Mass Ratio and Lead
Leaching to Water, 99 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 96, 98 (2007).
95 See id. (noting that in a study of a subset of utilities, 100% of the utilities with CSMRs
under 0.58 were in compliance with the lead action limit, compared to 36% of utilities with
CSMRs above 0.58).
96 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17; see also Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water R
in Flint: A Step-By-Step Look at the Makings of a Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.npr
.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-
look-at-the-makings-of-a-crisis.
97 Kennedy, supra note 96.
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began to use more chlorine disinfectant in the water.98  In January of 2015,
the level of total trihalomethanes (TTHM), a disinfectant byproduct created
by a reaction between chlorine and organic matter, exceeded the MCL,
which resulted in another SDWA violation.99  To reduce the level of disinfec-
tant byproduct in the water, the City of Flint used ferric chloride to coagulate
organic matter.100  The EPA recommends that utilities examine the potential
impacts of treatment changes affecting the CSMR on lead concentration, cit-
ing systems with a CSMR of greater than 0.2 but less than 0.5 of significant
concern and a CSMR of greater than 0.5 of serious concern.101  The addition
of ferric chloride to drinking water can increase the CSMR, leading to
increased corrosion of lead.102
The switch to FWTP may also have increased the likelihood of Legionella
contamination, contributing to Legionellosis outbreaks in 2014 and 2015.103
Legionellosis, infections caused by Legionella bacteria, can range from a mild
febrile illness to a severe form of pneumonia referred to as Legionnaires’
disease.104
For several years preceding the water source change, the annual tally of
Legionellosis cases in Genesee County remained below ten.105  From June
2014 to March 2015 there were forty-five cases resulting in five deaths, and
from May 2015 to October 2015 there were forty-three more cases resulting
in four deaths.106  Around a third of the patients were exposed to FWTP
drinking water, and many were potentially exposed in healthcare facilities.107
The conditions in self-contained air supply systems such as healthcare facili-
ties can foster the growth of Legionella, and ill, advance-aged, or immune-
compromised individuals are particularly susceptible to Legionella
infections.108
The FWATF noted that “the pattern of an abrupt increase in cases of
Legionellosis in Genesee County in 2014–15 that occurred after a shift to the
Flint River strongly implicates the water source and treatment of the water as
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Torrice, supra note 50.
101 NGUYEN ET AL., supra note 92, at xxiv.
102 See Edwards & Triantafyllidou, supra note 94, at 108–09 (“A switch from sulfate-
containing coagulants to those containing chloride can increase CSMR, which in turn can
create a lead hazard in water.  Problems can arise even in systems in which solder has been
passivated over a period of decades with orthophosphate inhibitor.”); Del Toral Memo,
supra note 72, at 2.  Galvanic corrosion, a form of corrosion important in drinking water
systems, occurs when metals with sufficiently dissimilar potentials couple.  The anode, the
more electronegative metal, is oxidized.  EPA OCCT, supra note 85, at 9.
103 See FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 24–25.
104 WORLD HEALTH ORG., LEGIONELLA AND THE PREVENTION OF LEGIONELLOSIS 1 (Jamie
Bartram et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter WHO].
105 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
106 Id. at 24–25.
107 Id.
108 See WHO, supra note 104, at 2, 12, 95 (revealing elevated attack rate of Legion-
naires’ disease in hospitals); see also FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
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a potential cause of higher Legionellosis case incidence.”109  A genetic link
between Legionella bacteria found at Flint’s McLaren Hospital and three cases
of Legionnaires’, along with other evidence, suggested a connection between
the switch in water source and the outbreak.110  The Michigan Department
of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) and the Genesee County Health
Department (GCHD) failed to notify the public of the Legionellosis outbreak
in a timely manner.111
FWTP water may have contributed to the Legionellosis outbreak via mul-
tiple pathways.  One suggested mechanism is the disruption of the biofilm on
the surface of lines and structures during flushing of water mains conducted
in response to complaints about water quality.112  Biofilms are formed when
microorganisms adhere to surfaces, typically through the secretion of a
polysaccharide substance referred to as the glycocalyx.113  The movement of
water over the surface can cause parts of the biofilm to dislodge and resus-
pend in the water.114  After receiving complaints regarding the color of the
water, the Flint Utilities Department flushed water mains.  This may have dis-
rupted the biofilm on the surface of water mains and service lines and
released bacteria, including Legionella, back into the water to recolonize
other areas in the distribution system.115
The increase in water corrosivity may have played a role in the Legionel-
losis outbreak in addition to the lead contamination.116  Scale and corrosion
foster the formation of biofilms by increasing surface area.117  This creates
micro-niches that shield organisms from disinfectants, and leads to greater
concentrations of nutrients such as iron.118  Iron corrosion can also promote
Legionella colonization by reducing the amount of chlorine available to kill
bacteria.119  The Larson Iron Corrosion Index, a measure of corrosivity to
109 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
110 See, e.g., Davit Otto Schwake et al., Legionella DNA Markers in Tap Water Coincident
with a Spike in Legionnaires’ Disease in Flint, MI, 3 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. LETTERS 311, 314
(2016); Karen Bouffard, Hospital Ties Legionnaires’ to Flint Water, DET. NEWS (Jan. 23, 2016),
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/22/legionnaires-bacteria-
found-tests-mclaren-medical-centers-water/79183428/; Steve Carmody, New Tests Raise
Questions About the Source of Legionnaires Disease Outbreak, MICH. RADIO (Feb. 16, 2017),
http://michiganradio.org/post/new-tests-raise-questions-about-source-legionnaires-dis-
ease-outbreak.
111 See FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
112 Id. at 25; Del Toral Memo, supra note 72, at 2.
113 WHO, supra note 104, at 33.
114 Id.
115 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
116 WHO, supra note 104, at 36.
117 Id.
118 See id. (explaining that iron is a key nutrient for Legionella ssp.); see also Schwake et
al., supra note 110, at 313.
119 Schwake et al., supra note 110, at 313 (“Low levels of chlorine are consistent with
expectations of corrosion-induced decay. . . . [I]t is well-known that disinfectant residual
maintenance is critical for reducing risk of Legionnaires’ disease.”).
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iron, was measured at 0.54 prior to the switch to Flint water and 2.3 after.120
The Larson Index is the ratio of sulfate and chloride to bicarbonate,121 with
which the corrosion rate increases linearly.122
Other factors—such as water temperature and flow—can contribute to
the presence of Legionella in water systems.  Water temperature is a key factor
to Legionella colonization of water distribution systems.123  The distribution
system water temperature of Flint River water was higher than that of DWDS
water.124  Low water flow and stagnation also affect the growth of Legionella
in water distribution systems.125  Water use dropped with Flint’s population,
which meant that water spent a relatively long time in the distribution sys-
tem.126  This stagnation likely fostered conditions conducive to Legionella
growth in Flint’s water.127
D. Blame
The MDEQ, the state-appointed emergency managers, and Michigan
Governor Rick Snyder failed to stem the flow of contaminated water until
October 2015, when Flint finally was reconnected to DWSD (now called the
Great Lakes Water Authority) and safe water.128  MDEQ continued to claim
the FWTP water was safe, and the Governor’s office ignored suggestions from
senior staff members to act earlier.129
In early December 2015, the City began additional treatment of the
water in the city system, in an attempt to mitigate effects of the contamina-
tion.130  On December 14, 2015, the City declared a state of emergency.131
On January 14, 2016, the Governor declared a state of emergency and
requested federal aid.132  On January 16, 2016, President Barack Obama
declared a state of national emergency in Flint.133  On January 21, 2016, the
120 Edwards et al., supra note 88, at D-1.
121 Mark W. LeChevallier et al., Examining the Relationship Between Iron Corrosion and the
Disinfection of Biofilm Bacteria, 85 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 111, 120 (1993).
122 Edwards et al., supra note 88, at D-1.
123 See FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 33 (recommending temperatures for cold R
water distribution below 25°C and ideally below 20°C).
124 Schwake et al., supra note 110, at 313 (“It is noteworthy that distribution system
water temperature increased during Flint River water use compared to prior experience
with Detroit water (treatment plant effluent mean of 20.9°C in August 2013 versus
23.3–24.0°C the two following years).”).
125 See WHO, supra note 104, at 62.
126 See FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 38.
129 Id.
130 EPA, SDWA EMERGENCY ORDER FOR FLINT, MICH., EPA Doc. No. SDWA 05-2015-000,
at 5 (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/1_
21_sdwa_1431_emergency_admin_order_012116.pdf.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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EPA issued an Emergency Order pursuant to the SWDA compelling state
officials to take specific steps to assure the safety of the public water
system.134
Isolating blame in this case was extremely difficult.135  In terms of legal
liability, it obviously matters what decisions caused the specific harms alleged.
The decision to use Flint River water, for example, was not the same as the
decision to use it without proper treatment, or the decision to continue using
it in the face of accumulating concerns over its safety.
Other actors played a role in this debacle, including MDHHS, the City of
Flint, GCHD, and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
which exercises ultimate control over Michigan environmental standards
enforcement.136  At no level—local, county, state, or federal—did the rele-
vant government actors assure adequate water quality safeguards were in
134 Id. at 11–15.
135 See, e.g., Lenny Bernstein, EPA’s McCarthy Stands Up to Claims Her Agency Is Responsible
for Flint Water Crisis, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2016), http://wpo.st/Yb222 (reporting on
McCarthy’s testimony before Congress on EPA involvement in water crisis); Lenny Bern-
stein & Brady Dennis, Flint’s Water Crisis Reveals Government Failures at Every Level, WASH.
POST (Jan. 24, 2016), http://wpo.st/s5a12 (discussing multiple levels of fault); Lenny
Bernstein, Michigan Governor to Blame State Environmental Agency for Flint Lead Water Crisis,
CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/midwest/
ct-flint-lead-water-crisis-rick-snyder-20160316-story.html (reporting on Governor Snyder’s
statement that he would testify before Congress that “systemic failures” at Michigan’s envi-
ronmental protection agency led to the poisoning of Flint’s water supply); Anna Clark, The
Struggle for Accountability in Flint, BOS. REV. (Feb. 2, 2016), http://bostonreview.net/us/
anna-clark-flint-water-public-records (discussing the complexities of blame and lack of
transparency in Michigan); Karoun Demirjian, Lawmakers Wrestle With Who Is Responsible for
Flint Water Crisis, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2016), http://wpo.st/u3a12 (discussing congres-
sional hearings on crisis); Louis Jacobson, Who’s to Blame for the Flint Water Crisis?, POLI-
TIFACT (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/feb/15/
whos-blame-flint-water-crisis/ (discussing the various actors and their alleged roles in the
crisis); Merrit Kennedy, Independent Investigators: State Officials Mostly to Blame for Flint Water
Crisis, NPR (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/23/47158
5633/independent-investigators-state-officials-mostly-to-blame-for-flint-water-crisis (report-
ing on the findings of FWATF); Cameron McWhirter, Michigan Officials Responsible for Flint
Water Crisis, Panel Finds, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/michi-
gan-officials-responsible-for-flint-water-crisis-governor-appointed-panel-finds-1458762906
(reporting on FWA Task Force Report); Oliver Milman, Flint Blame Game: Former EPA Man-
ager Says State Officials at Fault for Water Crisis, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/15/flint-water-crisis-epa-michigan-congressional-
hearing?CMP=share_btn_link (reporting on EPA official’s claim that Michigan officials
ignored warnings from the EPA that the water may be unsafe); Josh Sanburn, “Series of
Government Failures” Blamed for Flint Water Crisis, TIME (Mar. 23, 2016), http://time.com/42
69300/flint-task-force-report-water-crisis/?xid=emailshare (discussing findings of FWATF);
see also Flint Drinking Water Documents, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/mi/flint-drinking-water-
documents (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
136 See Amanda Emery, EPA Didn’t Respond to Flint’s Water Crisis as Soon as It Could Have,
Report Says, FLINT J. (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2016/
02/epa_didnt_respond_to_flints_wa.html.
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place during the time the water supply was contaminated.137  Coordination
problems, improper testing and training, resource deficiencies, inadequate
and improperly enforced legal standards, and extremely poor judgment com-
bined to create a man-made environmental and health disaster.138
Moreover, Michigan law made it difficult to determine who was ulti-
mately responsible for the actions of the emergency manager.  Some blamed
the City of Flint.  Yet the City of Flint’s authority—and thus its responsibil-
ity—was stripped by effectively placing it into receivership.139  The City had
no practical control over the emergency manager’s decisions and was
reduced to rubber-stamping rather than independent decisionmaking.140
Citizens of Flint could also deny democratic accountability, since the Emer-
gency Managers were imposed on them rather than voted into office.141
Plaintiffs alleged that blame should be assigned as follows:
• Defendants Wyant, Shekter Smith, Rosenthal, Busch, Cook, and
Prysby “participated in the decisions that deliberately created,
increased and prolonged the public health crisis at issue in this case
and participated in the concealment of the harm.”142
• Defendant Wurfel “was responsible for the deliberately misleading
and inaccurate communications that increased and prolonged the
public health crisis at issue in this case and . . . [made] false state-
ments and provid[ed] false assurances which caused harm to
Plaintiffs.”143
• The MDEQ Defendants, among others, participated in the decisions
to “(1) use the toxic Flint River as a primary drinking source; (2)
conceal the resulting public health crisis; and (3) exacerbate and
prolong the harm by failing to effectively remediate the public health
crisis they created and attempted to conceal.”144
• The MDEQ Defendants (inferentially referenced as “the State”),
each “created a dangerous public health crisis for the users of Flint
tap water when . . . [they] and Kurtz and Earley ordered and set in
motion the use of highly corrosive and toxic Flint River water know-
ing that the WTP was not ready.”145
• Further, for at least a year prior to June 2012, the State, including
these MDEQ Defendants, knew that using Flint River water was dan-
gerous and could cause serious public health issues.  (“January 23,
2013: Mike Prysby/MDEQ e-mails colleague Liane Shekter Smith and
137 Demirjian, supra note 135.
138 Id.
139 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
142 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 8–9.
143 Id. at 11.
144 Id. at 4–5.
145 Id. at 21.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 17 15-NOV-17 13:47
2017] flint  of  outrage 171
others about feasibility of Flint switching to Flint River, highlighting
water quality concerns.”146)
• On April 16, 2014, Michael Glasgow, the City of Flint’s water treat-
ment plant’s water quality supervisor informed the MDEQ that the
WTP was not fit to begin operations.  (“Glasgow wrote Prysby and
Busch of the MDEQ, that ‘ . . . I have people above me making plans
to distribute water ASAP.  I was reluctant before . . . I do not antici-
pate giving the OK to begin sending water out anytime soon.  If water
is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it will be
against my direction.’”147)
• On January 21, 2015, State officials ordered water coolers to be
installed in State buildings operating in Flint yet did nothing to simi-
larly protect the people of Flint.  (“MDEQ staff (Prysby, Shekter
Smith, Benzie, numerous others) communicate via e-mail re: deci-
sion to provide water coolers at Flint’s State Office building.  Some
discussion re: how this decision will affect Flint residents’ perceptions
of drinking water safety, and how the decision will ‘make it more
difficult . . . for ODWMA staff.’”).148
• By the end of January 2015, the Governor’s office was fully aware of
the public health emergency caused by the rise in Legionella bacteria
found in the Flint River and launched a cover-up of the public health
crisis.  (“January 30, 2015: Brad Wurfel/MDEQ e-mails Dave Murray,
Governor Snyder’s deputy press secretary, re: Legionella, saying said
he didn’t want MDEQ Director Wyant ‘to say publicly that the water
in Flint is safe until we get the results of some county health depart-
ment trace back work on 42 cases of Legionellosis in Genesee County
since last May.’”).149
• On June 24, 2015, Miguel Del Toral of the EPA prepared a report
warning of high lead levels in Flint water.  This report was shared
with Liane Shekter Smith, Patrick Cook, Stephen Busch, and Michael
Prysby.150  Yet these Defendants completely disregarded this critical
information.151
A particularly helpful roadmap to determining who did what to whom
was the report of an independent five-member body—the FWATF—which
was appointed by Governor Rick Snyder to investigate the disaster and make
recommendations.  Its final report, issued in March of 2016, documented the
multiple ways in which each of the foregoing government actors failed
Flint.152
146 Id. at 21 n.5.
147 Id. at 20 n.4 (first alteration in original).
148 Id. at 24 n.14 (alteration in original).
149 Id. at 25 n.17.
150 Id. at 29–30.
151 Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Response to the MDEQ Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss at 7–8,
Mays v. Snyder, 2017 WL 445637 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017) (No. 15-cv-14002).
152 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1.
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The report concluded that the State of Michigan, under the leadership
of Governor Rick Snyder, was “fundamentally accountable” because agencies
charged with enforcing drinking water regulations and protecting public
health had failed to do their job.153  It specifically slammed the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality and the Michigan Department of
Health and Human Services for working to “deride[ ] and dismiss[ ]”
attempts to bring to light concerns over unsafe water, lead contamination,
and a reported increase in cases of Legionnaires’ disease.154
Its recommendations included rewriting of water quality laws, tighter
enforcement of existing standards, engagement of highly trained experts,
and adoption of a coordinated governance framework for better identifying
and responding to environmental emergencies.155  Corrosion control mea-
sures alone, it noted, would not solve the problem of water contamination.156
Lead service lines needed to be replaced, and private water consumers also
would have to cooperate to assure water safety.157
II. THE CIVIL LAWSUITS
Multiple civil lawsuits were filed in Genesee County Circuit Court,158 the
Michigan Court of Claims,159 and the United States District Court in
Detroit.160  Claims included tort claims, claims of professional negligence,
and constitutional arguments.  In some of the cases, plaintiffs sought class
action certification.161  In all of them, plaintiffs faced formidable procedural
and substantive obstacles.162
153 Id. at 38.
154 Id. at 37.
155 Id. at 10–14.
156 Id. at 153–54.
157 Id. at 53.
158 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newman, P.C.,
No. 16-106150 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 25, 2016).  The firm is an engineering services and
program management company that oversaw the refit of Flint’s aging Water Treatment
Plant when it separated itself from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department in 2014.
Id. at 5. The lawsuit alleged that the company knew Flint River water needed anticorrosion
treatment chemicals, yet did not require them or test the water coming out of taps before
completing the switch. Id.  Several related suits were filed in Genesee County Court. See,
e.g., Walters v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newman, P.C., No. 16-106326 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar. 3,
2016); Mays v. City of Flint, No. 16-106112 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 19, 2016); Collins v. Snyder,
No. 16-106077 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 7, 2016); Order Certifying this Action as Class Action,
Shears v. Bingaman, No. 14-103476 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 31, 2015), available at https://www
.scribd.com/document/277278159/Flint-Water-Class-Cerf08312015.
159 Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct 26, 2016).
160 Mays Complaint, supra note 3.
161 See, e.g., id.
162 Legal experts recognize this and some stated publicly that the suits were not likely
to yield sufficient benefits for the parties or their counsel to be worth the expense and
effort. See Lenny Bernstein & Brady Dennis, Flint Water Crisis Victims Increasingly Turn to
Courts but Face Big Obstacles, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/national/health-science/flint-water-crisis-victims-increasingly-turn-to-courts-but-face-
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The focus here is on Mays v. Snyder, which was filed in federal district
court against government officials, including the governor and other state
actors, and on the constitutional arguments made in these cases.163  We ana-
lyze only the state actor claims because they had the greatest potential signifi-
cance for other disputes, given the State’s greater resources and ability to
respond to water crises statewide.  Yet we recognize that a web of actors cre-
ated this crisis.  We also discuss and critique the preemption argument based
on the SWDA that ultimately—and incorrectly—persuaded the district judge
to dismiss the civil rights claims.  Finally, we acknowledge what many experts
in civil rights litigation have stressed: principles of sovereign and official
immunity as well as judicial reluctance to take on complex constitutional tort
issues make it incredibly difficult to hold officials accountable in safe water
cases,164 even if the substantive constitutional arguments discussed here were
to prevail.  We explain why this reluctance is tragic and unnecessary in cases
where the governmental default is this shocking and profound.
A. Consensus
Central facts in the federal lawsuits were uncontested.  Indeed, the
broad and unqualified concession in the State’s brief in Mays is worth quot-
ing: “No one disputes that the Flint drinking water situation has detrimentally affected
Flint residents, businesses, and public entities, and sparked significant health and
safety concerns.”165
But of course, hindsight perfects vision, and the relevant law focuses on
what the responsible officials knew or should have known ex ante.166  The
law also generally—though not entirely—insulates officials from harms that
do not rise to the level of a fundamental right.  Finally, even ex ante foresee-
able harmful consequences that befall a suspect class may not be a basis for
equal protection liability if a rational, nonarbitrary reason for choosing the
big-obstacles/2016/02/10/92abc9a2-cf67-11e5-abc9-ea152f0b9561_story.html (“‘On the
face of it, the lead scandal in Flint, Michigan, looks like it should be a billion-dollar mass
tort,’ said Nora Freeman Engstrom, a professor and expert on tort law at Stanford Univer-
sity.  ‘You have a clear villain . . . and you have very sympathetic plaintiffs.’  But, she said,
‘the most likely thing that happens to you in this country when you are negligently injured
is you never see a penny.’” (alteration in original)).
163 Mays Complaint, supra note 3.
164 The State of Michigan as such was immune.  The parties sought remedies under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the specific government officials and were required to satisfy the
statutory requirements of that Act.
165 State of Michigan, Governor Snyder, Andy Dillon, and Nick Lyon’s Brief in Support
of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Mays v. Snyder, 2017 WL 445637 (E.D. Mich. Nov 13, 2015) (No.
15-cv-14002) [hereinafter Mays Motion to Dismiss] (emphasis added); see also Bernstein &
Dennis, supra note 162.
166 For a discussion of judicial struggles with hindsight bias in constitutional cases, see
Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 377, 403 (2014).
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ultimately harmful course of action can be asserted ex post.167  Thus the
uncontested facts were hardly dispositive of plaintiffs’ claims about constitu-
tional liability.
B. Dissensus
The State and state officials moved to dismiss on several grounds, includ-
ing arguments that the injuries were not state-caused, that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
requirements were not met, that federal laws preempted the § 1983 claims,
and that the Eleventh Amendment barred aspects of the action.168
The defendants also assured the court that political responsiveness had
begun in earnest and judicial sanctions were thus unnecessary.  Specifically,
they noted that the following steps had already been taken by state officials:
• Declaring a state of emergency, activating the State’s Emergency
Operations Center, and calling up the National Guard to assist with
measures including door-to-door provision of bottled water, filters,
replacement cartridges, and testing kits;
• Seeking federal emergency and disaster declarations, resulting in fed-
eral resources and at least $5 million in federal funds to assist the
people of Flint;
• Facilitating Flint’s return to the Detroit water system through $9.35
million in state funds, and immediately implementing other response
actions, including lead testing to city residents;
• Approving an additional $28 million overwhelmingly supported by
the Michigan Legislature to aid Flint in combating the water crisis,
with a focus on services for children with lead poisoning;
• Proposing an additional $195 million in the state budget toward the
crisis in Flint and $165 million to address aging infrastructure
statewide;
• Providing funds toward replacing lead service lines; and,
• Most recently, appropriating $30 million to reimburse Flint residents
for their water bills.169
The federal funding alluded to by the defendants vastly exceeded the
State’s $5 million request.170  The United States Senate moved to amend
national legislation to assist Flint and also provide support for harbor mainte-
167 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271–80 (1979) (holding that fore-
seeable disparate impact of veteran’s preference in employment did not violate equal pro-
tection rights of female workers).
168 See Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 1–2.
169 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 20–27.
170 Water Resources Development Act of 2016, S. 2848, 114th Cong. § 7404 (2016).
This federal aid was stalled when the government removed funding for Flint in order to
reach an agreement during budget negotiations to prevent a shutdown of the United
States government. See Stan Collender, Shutdown Averted but Flint Still Waits, DEMOCRACY
(Sept. 30, 2016), http://democracyjournal.org/arguments/shutdown-averted-but-flint-still-
waits/.
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nance, dam construction, and water quality measures.171  A House Bill also
passed that would provide $170 million in funding to Flint, and the bills went
to a conference committee for reconciliation and in December 2016 a final
version was approved that included $120 million for Flint.172
Finally, the state actors attacked the constitutional claims for relief
under equal protection and due process as legally inadequate.173  In the fol-
lowing sections, we outline the constitutional arguments.
C. Constitutional Claims
Relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,174 plaintiffs raised substantive due process
and equal protection claims.  The substantive due process claims were that
the state actors violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to bodily integrity
and protection from state-created danger, as well as their right to protection
from government conduct that shocks the conscience.  The equal protection
claims alleged that the harms to Flint residents were targeted harms based on
race and poverty.
1. Fundamental Rights
Two primary strands of substantive due process rights are relevant to the
civil cases.  One involves fundamental rights.  The fundamental rights alleged
in the Flint cases are not enumerated in the Constitution, but are allegedly
protected through the Due Process Clauses.175  They are “penumbral” liberty
rights, like the rights to marital privacy, reproductive autonomy, and child-
rearing decisions, which have been deemed so fundamental to an American
sense of liberty that the courts will closely scrutinize government interference
with them.  The scope of these fundamental rights is vague and contested,
but the existence of unenumerated fundamental rights is settled law.176
171 S. 2848; see Coral Davenport, With Nod to Flint Crisis, Senate Weighs a $9 Billion Water
Infrastructure Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/us/politics/
senate-water-bill.html. The Senate Bill included the following features: (1) Authorized $20
million a year for five years to test schools and child care centers for lead.  (2) Directed the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to establish a lead exposure registry and pro-
vide health consultations to citizens who may suffer the effects of high lead levels.  (3)
Authorized $10 million for childhood lead poisoning prevention efforts.  (4) Required a
report on ongoing investigations into the Flint drinking water situation and the govern-
ment response.  (5) Allowed for previous water infrastructure loans made to Flint and
other cities to be forgiven if a threat of lead in a drinking water supply has prompted an
emergency declaration by the president. See S. 2848.
172 See Safe Drinking Water Act Improved Compliance Awareness Act, H.R. 4470, 114th
Cong. (2016).
173 See discussion of these arguments infra Section II.C.
174 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
175 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 1–2.
176 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134–54 (2013).
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The litigants in the Flint cases argued that established unenumerated
rights support an implied right to bodily integrity and to state protection
from harms from third parties.177  They further asserted that both funda-
mental rights were violated in this case.
a. Third-Party Harms
Plaintiffs first alleged that state defendants violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by failing to protect them from “risks, dangers, [and] dangerous
situations.”178  The State, along with the web of actors with whom it dealt,
profoundly defaulted in its duties.179  Moreover, the State alone had primary
control over the applicable actors and dangers.180  Even the EPA, which had
ultimate authority over the MDEQ, could claim that the federal laws assigned
primary power to the State of Michigan, as a matter of cooperative federal-
ism.181  The acts that caused the danger to Flint residents also were not
unpredictable acts of private third parties, but acts by the emergency manag-
ers, the Governor, and other officials under state control.182
The state actors responded that due process imposes only negative limits
on government action; it does not establish a positive right to life, liberty, or
property.183  An actionable state-created danger arises only if (1) the plaintiff
and the state actor have a sufficiently direct relationship giving rise to a duty
not to subject plaintiff to danger from a private, third party; and (2) the state
actors were sufficiently culpable to be liable under a substantive due process
theory.184  In this case, the alleged misconduct was by government officials
alone; no private third party was involved.
Government actors cannot be held liable for inaction, except in a few
well-defined situations.185  Liability for inaction occurs only where the inac-
tion is egregious and the government has special responsibility for the peril
created.  For example, if the government assumes an affirmative duty to act
through promises or action on which the victim relies, this may be
sufficient.186
The state actors insisted that these criteria were not met because expo-
sure to toxic water by government, not actions of a private third party, caused
177 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 1, 41–42.
178 Id. at 38.
179 FWATF FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 20–27.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 18–19.
183 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (not-
ing that “[t]he Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guaran-
tee of certain minimal levels of safety and security”).
184 See Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Jones v.
Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2006).
185 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 758–68 (2005); DeShaney, 489
U.S. at 201–02.
186 See Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443, 444 (N.Y. 1989) (requiring a “spe-
cial relationship”).
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their harms.187  The state actors also noted that the decision to use the con-
taminated water was made by an emergency manager.188  Under state law,
they argued, the emergency manager’s decisions were attributable to local
government, not the State.189  Finally, the plaintiffs could not show that the
specific plaintiffs or members of the class they sought to represent had been
targeted by the State or placed at risk of special danger.  Plaintiffs did not
allege that the state actors knew of or should have known the switch to Flint
River water would hurt them in particular.190
b. Bodily Integrity
The plaintiffs asserted that they were denied their fundamental right of
bodily integrity.191  The state actors conceded that fundamental rights under
due process include a right to bodily integrity under Washington v. Gluck-
sberg.192  But they insisted that this right should be construed narrowly, lest
due process become “a font of tort law.”193  They noted that other courts
addressing similar arguments have held the right to bodily integrity did not
embrace a right to clean water or a healthful environment.194   Nor did it
include the right to be “free from the introduction of an allegedly contami-
nated substance in the public drinking water.”195  Thus, the state actors alleg-
edly had no duty to protect plaintiffs from contaminated water under the
Fourteenth Amendment.  If any such federal duty did exist, it arose from the
Safe Drinking Water Act, not the Constitution.196
Finally, the state actors denied that they had “deliberately and know-
ingly” violated plaintiffs’ constitutional right to bodily integrity. 197  They
187 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 16.
188 Id.
189 See Kincaid v. City of Flint, 874 N.W.2d 193, 201 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that an act of the emergency manager is an act of the governor).
190 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 17.
191 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 40–41.
192 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 17–18 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
193 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (“[S]uch a reading would make of the Four-
teenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may
already be administered by the States.”); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 125 (1992) (noting that “the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept
of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended”).
194 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 18–19 (first citing Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971); then citing In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp.
928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); then citing Pinkney v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 375 F. Supp.
305, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1974); then citing Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537
(S.D. Tex. 1972); and then citing Coshow v. City of Escondido, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 30 (Cal.
App. 4th 2005)); see also Paul Finkelman, Why Access to Water Was Never a “Right”: Historical
Perspectives on American Water Law, 18 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 168 (2010).
195 Coshow, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 31.
196 SDWA, supra note 47.
197 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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were entitled to a “presumption that the administration of government pro-
grams is based on a rational decisionmaking process that takes account of
competing social, political, and economic forces.”198  Even if their deci-
sions—in hindsight—were gravely wrong, there was no evidence the state
actors acted with a harmful purpose.199  The conduct thus did not meet the
high standard of knowing and deliberate indifference set by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.200
The defendants characterized plaintiffs’ claims as a right to uncontami-
nated water, which would mean they were asserting a new, unenumerated
fundamental right.  Plaintiffs vigorously denied that this was their claim.
Instead, they argued that the defendants engaged in the following, detailed
conduct:
[They] affirmatively misrepresented and then deliberately concealed the
truth from the public regarding, among other things: (a) their racially dis-
criminatory decision to foist the switch to the unsafe Flint River from the
Detroit Water and Sewerage department (“DWSD”) solely upon a predomi-
nantly African-American community; (b) their unpreparedness for the
switch to the Flint River; (c) their knowledge of the corrosiveness of Flint’s
water; (d) their knowledge that the failure to treat such water with a corro-
sion-control agent would result in lead and other toxic contaminants leach-
ing from the pipes in the water distribution system, and, despite this
knowledge, their decision not to treat the water with a corrosion-control
agent; (e) their knowledge regarding the contamination of the drinking
water with lead and other toxic substances; (f) their failure to properly test
the water for lead contamination and their criminal tampering with test
results and false reporting of lead levels in order to conceal their findings
from the public; (f) [sic] their knowingly over-treating of the water with
chlorine, resulting in contamination by dangerous trihalomethanes
(THMs); (g) their deliberate failure to prepare for and properly treat the
Flint River water resulted in dangerous levels of Legionella and E. coli bacte-
ria to which Flint residents were exposed; (h) their deliberate, misleading,
and false discounting to the public of the accuracy and validity of water test-
ing and reports issued by Dr. Mark Edwards regarding the presence of high
levels of lead in Flint’s drinking water, as well as their misleading discount-
ing and misrepresentation of Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha’s published findings
that the switch to the water from the Flint River caused the increase in blood
lead levels of children in Flint; and (i) their deliberate misleading of the
public regarding the hazards of the lead in Flint’s drinking water despite
198 Collins, 503 U.S. at 128.
199 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 20 (citing Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d
573, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2014)).
200 Id. at 21 (citing Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 513 (6th Cir. 2002)); see
also Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 493 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).  The state defendants also argued that plaintiffs failed
to distinguish adequately among the state actors or to specifically define the defaults of
each. Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 22. Respondeat superior alone did not
support a constitutional claim against a supervisor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
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their knowledge of the serious hazards to the health of the Flint residents,
especially the children, of such exposure.201
Key to the analysis of the fundamental rights plaintiffs asserted in Mays
thus was whether the allegedly narrow rights asserted—freedom from third-
party harms and the right to bodily integrity—were sufficiently distinguisha-
ble from an alleged right to clean water.  No right to clean water has yet been
declared by the United States Supreme Court.  Moreover, to the extent the
claim could be reduced to a claim for clean water, it risked preemption by
the federal Safe Water Drinking Act.202
2. Shocks the Conscience
The second due process strand invoked in the Flint civil cases did not
hinge on the existence of a recognized fundamental or specifically enumer-
ated right.  Plaintiffs asserted that the government actions were outra-
geous.203  To succeed under this theory, plaintiffs needed to show that the
government’s conduct “shocks the conscience” even of those with the most
“hardened sensibilities.”204
This outrageousness claim rests on a theory that due process establishes
a constitutional floor to provide a minimum of decency and order that the
government must maintain in its varied activities.  This test triggers highly
deferential judicial review that provides a very light check on government
power.205
The plaintiffs argued that the Michigan officials’ conduct violated this
baseline due process demand.  It was constitutionally outrageous, and
shocked the conscience of even hardened sensibilities.206
The substantive due process floor is enlisted when government officials
engage in particularly egregious, arbitrary, or cruel acts that so violate princi-
ples of order and decency that due process is violated.  The challenge typi-
cally—though not always—is not to a law or other sovereign act that appears
irrational, but to conduct by a government official charged with enforcing or
administering the laws.207
The state actors defended their actions on the ground that no bad faith
or purpose was shown, that the financial receivership of Flint was warranted,
201 Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Response to the MDEQ Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss at
26–28, Mays v. Snyder, 2017 WL 445637 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017) (No. 15-cv-14002) (foot-
notes omitted).
202 Id. at ix.
203 Id. at 24.
204 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); see also Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998).
205 See Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 791 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995) (describing the bur-
den of proving this violation as “a virtually insurmountable uphill struggle”).
206 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 41.
207 Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV.
281, 282 (2015).
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and that the gross official errors visible in hindsight did not satisfy the test for
constitutionally outrageous government conduct ex ante.208
3. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”209  A law that
burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class triggers elevated scru-
tiny, under which the burden of proof is on the government to justify the
classification.  The end must be important or compelling, and the law must
be narrowly tailored to advance that end.210  Finally, the plaintiff must show
that the injury to a protected class was intentional.  A mere disparate impact
on a protected class is not sufficient to trigger elevated scrutiny.211  A law that
neither implicates a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class triggers
only rational basis review.212  These equal protection claims interweave with
due process claims, as explained below.213
Plaintiffs alleged that as Flint residents, they were treated differently
than other Genesee County residents: only they were under the authority of
the emergency managers.214  The state actors replied that Flint residents
were not similarly situated to these other county residents, because Flint had
been properly declared to be in a financial emergency under Michigan
law.215  Given that all similarly situated persons were treated alike, there was
no equal protection violation.
Plaintiffs also asserted race- and wealth-based violations of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.216
The state actors denied that race or wealth played a role in the process of
determining that Flint was in a state of emergency.217  They noted that “all of
the residents in the City of Flint—minority, non-minority, commercial, resi-
208 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 15.
209 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
210 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–34 (1996) (applying intermedi-
ate scrutiny and demanding “exceedingly persuasive justification” for gender classification
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (applying
strict scrutiny to racial classification that burdened fundamental right to marriage).
211 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
212 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).  The law
“must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”  FCC v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
213 See infra subsection III.A.3.
214 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 54–55.
215 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 42–43; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS.
§§ 141.1544, 141.1545 (2015).
216 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 48, 56.
217 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 26–30.
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dential, and governmental—received the untreated water that is the basis for
this claim. . . . This is not a protected class.”218
As the state actors further noted, the authority of the emergency man-
ager was made pursuant to a facially neutral act, the Local Stability and
Financial Control Act, Public Act 436 (P.A. 436).219  Public Act 436 was race-
neutral on its face.  In such circumstances, plaintiffs must show that the gov-
ernment acted with racially discriminatory intent in adopting the law, or in
implementing it.220
Five factors are relevant to determining whether facially neutral govern-
ment action was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose: (1) the
impact on particular racial groups; (2) the historical background of the chal-
lenged decision, especially if it reveals numerous actions being taken for dis-
criminatory purposes; (3) the sequence of events that preceded the action;
(4) procedural or substantive departures from the government’s normal pro-
cedural process; and (5) the legislative or administrative history.221 Plaintiffs
allegedly could not satisfy this test.
As to claims of wealth discrimination, the state actors denied that Flint
residents were treated adversely because they were poor.222  In any event,
wealth-based classifications trigger only rational basis review: poverty is not a
suspect classification.223  The state actors also denied, for reasons stated
above, that a fundamental right was implicated.  Consequently, only the low
rational basis test again applied, and this liberal test was not violated.224
Michigan had, the State argued, a legitimate government interest in address-
ing the insolvency of Flint.  The insolvency threatened the health, safety, and
218 Id. at 33.
219 Id. at 44.
220 The state actors argued as follows:
Plaintiffs . . . allege that the “cost of continuing with the finished water product
from the DWSD for all water users (both Genesee County and Flint) would have
been substantially less than the cost of upgrading the Flint WTP in order to safely
process the raw Flint water” and that “the clear difference in treatment between
these two groups of similarly situated water users” demonstrates that the decision
to switch to the Flint River was the product of racial discrimination.  First, even if
cost did not support the decision, it does not lead to the inference that race was
in fact the motivation for the decision, much less that it was “unexplainable on
grounds other than race.”  Second, the decision to use the Flint River cannot be
said to have a disparate impact as compared to Genesee County because, as noted
above, Emergency Manager Kurtz’s authority was limited.  His decision could only
reach Flint.  And Flint River water was delivered to all of Flint’s water system’s
customers, regardless of their race.  The fact that Genesee County customers—
who are on a separate water system under different management and not subject
to Flint’s Emergency Manager’s orders—could afford the rates required to stay
with DWSD does not demonstrate race was a motivating factor.
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
221 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
222 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 37–39.
223 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1973).
224 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 30.
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welfare of Flint residents and compromised Michigan’s credit and overall
economic condition.225  Decisions made by state officials or local emergency
managers addressing solvency issues, which led to the shift in water supply,
were minimally rational and thus survived rational basis review.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the state actors conspired to violate their
constitutional rights.226  The state actors replied that, given the alleged weak-
ness of the underlying equal protection claims, there could be no such con-
spiracy.227  Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment shielded the state actors in
their official capacities.228
III. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
There was no perfect fit between the Flint debacle and any existing, for-
mal constitutional category that protected the residents from such environ-
mental harms.  Each of the constitutional claims was a salmon argument,
swimming upstream against multiple adverse doctrinal currents.229  The
plaintiffs initially lost the battle at the district court level on highly debatable
preemption grounds, though the appellate court correctly reversed this
ruling.230
225 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1543(a), (b) (2013).
226 Mays Complaint, supra note 3, at 18–19.
227 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 50–52.  A conspiracy claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) has the following elements: “(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of
depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, and
(4) whereby a person is injured in his person or property or deprived of a right or privilege
of a citizen.”  Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 176 (2d Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  In addition, “there must be some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.”
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
228 The state actors alleged that Emergency Manager Kurtz had authority to make deci-
sions impacting Flint, but not to decide whether the remainder of Genesee County would
switch to the Flint River supply. Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 46.  The Gene-
see County Drain Commissioner was responsible for selecting the water supply in the
majority of Genesee County communities. Id.
229 Indeed, a recent analysis of climate change litigation notes that constitutional argu-
ments often are lodged against regulation, based on Dormant Commerce Clause or takings
arguments. See JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGU-
LATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY 38–40 (2015).  Proregulatory litigation often falters
for standing, separation of powers, and other reasons. See id. at 269–78.  Challenges to
executive authority to mitigate environmental harms also have made headway in federal
courts. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.) (granting stay of enforce-
ment of carbon emission guidelines, pending review by the D.C. Circuit); see also Jonathan
H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Feder-
alism and Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671 (2017) (discuss-
ing arguments against the Clean Air Act).
230 See infra text accompanying notes 328–31; see also Bambauer & Massaro, supra note
207, at 311–12.
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The plaintiffs’ arguments elided traditional constitutional categories
because constitutional law is clunky, often formalistic, subject to multiple
procedural hurdles, and ill-equipped to respond to the kind of harms
inflicted on Flint.  The injuries also were widely distributed and diffuse, and
the relevant sources of those harms were multivectored, structural, and
contextual.
Constitutional law also requires isolating government actors and
assigning specific blame to each.  This was a confounding endeavor in the
Flint cases, given Michigan law on emergency managers and the intersec-
tional nature of government control of Flint’s water quality.  In addition, the
defendants asserted potential preemption and official and sovereign immu-
nity obstacles.
Finally, the Constitution protects against intrusions into rights—or nega-
tive liberties—rather than assuring any affirmative right even to basic needs.
The line between a negative freedom from contaminated water and an
affirmative right to clean water is not easily drawn or enforced.
We outline the theories and explain why each maps uneasily onto these
plaintiffs.  We nevertheless conclude that none was beyond the pale and
argue that the truly horrific and extreme facts of the case made it a proper
one for the shocks the conscience due process test in particular.
A. Fundamental Rights
Substantive due process protects fundamental and nonfundamental lib-
erties.  Fundamental rights often receive the most attention because they trig-
ger elevated scrutiny, and therefore vest more power in the courts.  Within
the category of fundamental rights are two subtypes of rights: those derived
from enumerated rights set forth in the Bill of Rights and selectively “incor-
porated” into the Fourteenth Amendment, and “unenumerated” rights
deemed to be fundamental to ordered liberty.231
Most, but not all, of the first eight amendments have been deemed to be
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.232  Thus, most of the specific
constitutional rights that can be asserted against the states—such as freedom
of speech or protection against unreasonable searches and seizures—are due
process–based rights.  When rights from the Bill of Rights are incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment, they usually must be given the same mean-
ing as they have in the Bill of Rights; an asymmetrical reading must be justi-
fied.233  Therefore, the caselaw that defines freedom of speech under the
First Amendment applies equally to freedom of speech under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.234
231 See SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 176, at 134–54.
232 A notable exception is the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in a civil case.
This has not been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
233 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780–87 (2010).
234 Courts may describe such a claim against the state as a First Amendment claim even
though it is technically a due process claim. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 30 15-NOV-17 13:47
184 notre dame law review [vol. 93:1
Some courts believe that the Due Process Clauses protect only funda-
mental rights.235  This is incorrect.  A liberty interest that lacks fundamental
right status should trigger rational basis review, with a very strong presump-
tion in favor of government.236  Some discussions of substantive due process
miss this point, and treat all substantive due process cases as requiring the
identification of a fundamental or enumerated right at the outset.237
Courts, too, have confused the liberty right of freedom from outrageous
or irrational conduct with the due process principle that government behav-
ior must burden a right that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,” which is the standard to gain fundamental right status and trigger
elevated scrutiny.238
Fundamental rights, however, do not exhaust substantive due process
protections.  The weak outrageousness and rational basis brakes apply to fun-
damental and nonfundamental rights.239  They both are interstitial due pro-
cess protections reserved for the very worst forms of executive abuse of
authority.240  Like rational basis claims, shocks the conscience claims are dif-
ficult to win given the very high standard of proof and exceptionally strong
presumption that government officials acted within constitutional
parameters.
235 Ill. Psychological Ass’n v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987) (calling substan-
tive due process a “durable oxymoron” and suggesting it offers protection limited only to
fundamental rights).
236 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–89 (1955); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (noting that “[w]here the existence
of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts
beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judi-
cial inquiry”).
237 See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816–17
(11th Cir. 2004) (construing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), as failing to establish
a fundamental right relevant to adoption and suggesting that fundamental rights provide
the only route to a substantive due process victory); MFS, Inc. v. DiLazaro, 771 F. Supp. 2d
382, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (describing steps and concluding government conduct did not
shock the conscience in land use approval case); cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due
Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2008) (criticizing Lawrence v.
Texas for protecting rights through substantive due process that are not deeply rooted in
history and tradition).
238 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (noting that a party alleging
violation of substantive due process must include a “‘careful description’ of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest,” and must establish that “neither liberty nor justice would
exist if [it] were sacrificed” (first quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); and
then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
239 This does not mean that the relative importance of the liberty interest at stake is
irrelevant.  A court’s assessment of what is constitutionally outrageous or irrational is inevi-
tably dependent upon the significance or weight of the liberty interest affected.  But if only
fundamental liberty interests—so identified by the courts—triggered even rational basis
scrutiny, then the rational basis test would be superfluous: fundamental liberty interests
trigger elevated scrutiny, by definition.
240 See infra Section III.B.
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1. Third-Party Harms
The third-party harm theory was the second fundamental rights argu-
ment asserted by the plaintiffs.  It too faced rocky shoals.
First, the general rule is that government is not liable under due process
for inaction.  In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,241
the Court held that the state had not deprived Joshua DeShaney of constitu-
tionally protected rights by not removing him from the custody of an abusive
stepparent.242  The Court suggested that the result might have been different
if the state had played a role in creating the dangers to which the plaintiff was
exposed or if it had increased his vulnerability to these dangers.243
But DeShaney also made clear that the State’s mere awareness of a risk of
harm to an individual did not suffice to impose an affirmative duty to provide
protection.244  Likewise, the Court held that there is no substantive due pro-
cess right to a safe work environment in Collins v. City of Harker Heights.245
Constitutional liability may exist only where state officials deliberately or
intentionally place public employees in a dangerous situation without ade-
quate protection.246
Also, in all of these cases, actions of a third party—not of a government
official—caused the alleged harms.  Thus, some courts have restricted the
narrow right to protection from third-party harms to contexts in which a pri-
vate party produced the ultimate injuries.247  Yet even were this an accurate
statement of the principle, plaintiffs in Flint did focus on government
actions, not private third parties’ actions, in producing their injuries.  By
itself, the argument that third parties may have contributed to the debacle
seems insufficient.  Moreover, the plaintiffs’ argument was that multiple gov-
ernment actions, not mere inaction, exposed them to the harms of contami-
nated water.  Directing untreated Flint River water to them would seem to
241 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
242 Id. at 194–97.
243 Id. at 201–02.
244 Id. at 202.
245 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
246 Id. at 125–26; see, e.g., L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 120–21 (9th Cir. 1992) (con-
cluding that a registered nurse stated a constitutional claim against correctional officers
who intentionally assigned violent sex offender to work alone with nurse despite knowing
he was likely to become violent if alone with her); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake,
880 F.2d 348, 357, 359 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that where defendants had put plaintiff, a
town clerk, in a unique “position of danger” by causing inmates who were inadequately
supervised to be present in town hall, then “under the special danger approach as well as
the special relationship approach . . . the defendants owed [the plaintiff] a duty to protect
her from the harm they created”). But see Mitchell v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 107 F.3d 837, 839
n.3 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (noting that “Cornelius may not have survived Collins v.
City of Harker Heights”).
247 Michigan Court of Claims Judge Boonstra relied on these cases in granting the
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third-party harm claim.  Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-
000017, at 23–25 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016).
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satisfy the action requirement, despite the defendants’ attempt to character-
ize this as mere inaction, i.e., failure to treat the contaminated water.
2. Bodily Integrity
Strong intuition and important caselaw undergird the argument that
one has a fundamental right to control one’s body.248  The bodily integrity
argument holds considerable appeal in the Flint cases, and survived a motion
to dismiss in the Court of Claims.249
In Lucero v. Detroit Public Schools,250 a federal district court judge
addressed whether the decision to locate a public school on a contaminated
site violated substantive due process on this basis.  But she emphasized that
exposing the children to high risks of bodily harm needed to be shocking,
and based on “malice or sadism.”251  In other words, government officials are
not subject to constitutional liability for garden-variety negligence.  This
implies that if the level of misconduct is sufficiently high, and the risk is suffi-
ciently grave, courts may step in to redress the substantive due process harm.
Similar reasoning was given by the Michigan Court of Claims judge in
denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the bodily integrity argument in the
Flint case before him.  In his view, if the misconduct were shocking enough,
then the officials would be responsible for the bodily harm to the
plaintiffs.252
The risk of harm in Flint also was not abstract: exposure to unreasonable
levels of lead contamination has well-known, irreparable physical dangers.253
Exposure in this case also led to other harms, including psychological dis-
tress.254  Scientific uncertainty thus did not dog this case as it does many
others in which litigants seek to prevent or redress less clear, future, or con-
tested environmental harms.
Nevertheless, as Gowri Ramachandran has stated, a general, unnuanced,
and inalienable right to bodily integrity may be both descriptively and nor-
248 See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (discussing the right to refuse
medical treatment as being related to “rights to bodily integrity and freedom from
unwanted touching”).
249 Mays, No. 16-000017 at 26–44.
250 160 F. Supp. 2d 767 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
251 Id. at 799; cf. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 814 (S.D. Ohio
1995) (discussing potential bodily integrity claim where government exposed non-con-
senting persons to military radiation experiments).
252 Mays, No. 16-000017 at 28.
253 See supra notes 56–89 and accompanying text.  A particularly compelling brief on
the merits of the due process and equal protection arguments was filed with the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and makes excellent arguments that the problems with both
theories can be overcome in this case. See Reply Brief of Appellants Melissa Mays et al.,
Mays v. Snyder, 2017 WL 2180444 (6th Cir. May 16, 2017) (No. 17-1144).
254 See FWATF Final Report, supra note 1, at 55–56; cf. SHYAMAL CHOWDHURY ET AL.,
ARSENIC CONTAMINATION OF DRINKING WATER AND MENTAL HEALTH 37 (2016), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2811583.
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matively wrong.255  “Bodily integrity” covers vast terrain and may include
multiple contexts in which competing interests make even a right against
physical intrusions into the body problematic.256  The issue muddies quickly
when one considers how one person’s assertion of a “right to bodily integrity”
may be another’s exposure to serious communicable diseases, as compulsory
vaccination cases show.257  Or, it may be another’s right to dominion over
one’s own body, which becomes a complex question with respect to laws
against the sale of body parts.258
An additional problem with the reasoning of the Court of Claims’ ruling
in the Flint case is that the judge seemed to require a fundamental right plus
shocking conduct.  Thus if an appellate or other court rejects the notion that
a fundamental right to bodily integrity was violated, then even shocking offi-
cial conduct may not violate the Constitution.
We maintain, however, that this is an incorrect reading of the shocks the
conscience test.259  Properly understood, this baseline due process test
polices outrageous government conduct even when no recognized funda-
mental right has been violated.  Indeed, it would be unnecessary if it hinged
on the threshold determination of a fundamental right, given that these
already trigger elevated judicial scrutiny without a threshold showing of
outrageousness.
The liberty in play is the liberty to be free from outrageous government
conduct.  Like the rational basis test that holds government to a baseline
expectation of rationality even absent a fundamental right,260 the shocks the
conscience test may require officials to observe baseline standards of decency
even where no fundamental right has been violated.261
Moreover, we regard this as a virtue of the test.  It enables courts to
respond to gross misconduct without expanding fundamental rights to do so.
As we explain below, the shocks the conscience test holds officials to mini-
mum standards of decency and respect for valid public ends as a matter of
basic liberty.262
255 Gowri Ramachandran, Against the Right to Bodily Integrity: Of Cyborgs and Human
Rights, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing ways in which such a right—if unnuanced
and broadly construed—might interfere with important social and other goals).
256 Id. at 10–11.
257 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944); Zucht v. King, 260
U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). See generally Erwin
Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are Constitutional, 110 NW.
U. L. REV. 589 (2016).
258 See Ramachandran, supra note 255, at 10–11 (discussing these and other conflicts).
259 See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
260 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–89 (1955).
261 In fact, in cases where government decisions must be made rapidly and with a bare
minimum of judicial second-guessing, the shocks the conscience test may set the outer
boundary of unconstitutional conduct. See Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 207, at
310–15.
262 See infra Section III.B.  For a fuller expression of this interpretation of the liberty
baseline, see Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 207.
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3. Thick Rights Versus Thin?
Fundamental rights constitutionalize closer judicial oversight of law and
its administration.  Seeing this, litigants often aim at fundamental rights sta-
tus in order to secure meaningful scrutiny of government conduct, versus
hands-off review.  The Flint plaintiffs followed this pattern.
Close judicial oversight, however, may not always advance policy goals in
the ways advocates imagine.  As Professor Daniel Ho noted in his superb
study of food safety regulation,263 even very serious problems with arbitrary
or uneven implementation of administrative regulations may not be solved
with more process or judicial oversight.264
Close judicial review also has other, well-documented problems.  To
name just a few, it imposes high costs on state and federal officials, may inter-
fere unduly with legislative and executive discretion, and risks nationalizing
responses to problems better left to local and state management.  It can also
be imposed in contexts where no clear history of constitutional rights exists,
which may prompt concerns that in expanding rights the judiciary has veered
away from constitutional moorings and entered the realm of undemocratic
judicial lawmaking.
Finally, it may make crafting a judicially manageable remedy impossible.
Constitutionalizing a thick right works best when operationalizing the right
involves a fairly straightforward remedy.  In the same-sex marriage cases, to
take one recent example, the judicial ruling required states to provide same-
sex couples with equal access to marriage.  As rights implementation goes,
the judicial remedy was relatively straightforward even if the right itself was
deeply controversial.  Thorny peripheral consequences of the ruling have yet
to be worked out, such as determining whether and when private resistance
to the ruling on religious grounds must be allowed.  Yet the remedy for the
basic right merely required state officials to add same-sex couples to an
existing category of individuals to whom the right to marry applied, across all
relevant legal contexts.
The remedy for denying access to a fundamental right of bodily integrity
is not so straightforward.  First, the contours of the right itself are unclear, as
noted above.  Second, the remedy for violation of the right would require
ongoing supervision of a host of government actors who control water qual-
ity, and judicial review of complex official economic, scientific, and policy
decisions.  Common, articulable judicial standards would need to be estab-
lished to govern enforcement of the right as a matter of nationally applicable
263 Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work: An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (2017) (discussing peer review as alternative to “more process” as a means of
addressing inconsistent and inaccurate administration of public laws).
264 See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 194–209 (1983) (arguing that formal proceedings and judicial review may not cure
problems in administering public laws); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 279 (1998) (discussing ways in which
the modern administrative state defies conventional means of regulating exercise of
discretion).
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constitutional law.  Moreover, the right would need to be expressed in nega-
tive liberty terms, given the Court’s general resistance to affirmative constitu-
tional rights to basic subsistence needs like food, housing, or education.265
There is also no affirmative constitutional right to clean water.
In asserting that Michigan officials violated their fundamental rights, the
plaintiffs thus faced formidable obstacles.  The first was that neither the right
to state protection from third-party harms nor the right to bodily integrity in
the context of freedom from uncontaminated water occupies fundamental
right status per se: both were attempts to expand existing doctrine, which is
always a hard sell.266  The second was that the asserted rights veered close to
an affirmative argument that there is a constitutional right to clean water.
The third was that the back-up liberty argument in the absence of a funda-
mental right triggers only low-level judicial scrutiny, which is exceedingly dif-
ficult to fail.
Yet the fundamental right argument was hardly far-fetched.  Again, the
argument that a fundamental right to bodily integrity was violated survived
the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Court of Claims.267
Moreover, the Court may be willing to consider due process liberty
rights as both evolving and located on a spectrum rather than only in rigid,
historically recognized categories.  Of course, new appointments to the Court
may tilt it against such a theory and in favor of restraining constitutional
liberties—at least in the realm of environmental law.  Yet there currently is
precedent—joined by five justices—that supports a broader, more evolving
notion of liberty.
The same-sex marriage cases support this claim.  The right named in the
cases was neither thick nor thin per se.  It triggered something in between
the traditional rational basis test and the heightened protections typically
offered to fundamental rights and suspect classes.268  The majority also relied
on equal protection–styled arguments about arbitrariness, political
powerlessness, and historical discrimination, without declaring sexual orien-
tation to be a suspect classification.269
Likewise, litigants may look to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.,270 in which a local zoning ordinance excluded group homes for men-
tally disabled adults, but not other high-density uses like fraternities.  This
265 Litigants nevertheless continue to urge courts to create a federal constitutional right
to minimally adequate services such as education. See, e.g., Complaint, Detroit Fed’n of
Teachers v. Detroit Pub. Schs., No. 16-001178 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 2016) (arguing that
Detroit Public Schools failed to provide students with minimally adequate schools in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment).
266 See supra notes 240–57 and accompanying text; see, e.g., In re City of Detroit, No. 15-
cv-10038, 2015 WL 5461463, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part by
In re City of Detroit, 841 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2016).
267 Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017, at 26–44 (Mich. Ct. Cl. Oct. 26, 2016).
268 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
269 Id. at 2602–05.
270 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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violated the rational basis test of equal protection,271 even though housing is
not a fundamental right272 and disability is not a suspect classification.273
That is, liberty interests that are not fundamental per se may trigger
meaningful scrutiny when powerless but not formally “suspect” groups are
adversely affected.  Clean water access claims, along with other environmen-
tal justice claims, thus may qualify for this hybrid form of judicial scrutiny in
appropriate cases.274  Public officials that deliver badly and indisputably con-
taminated water to residents whose government is failing them so badly that
the state must intervene may violate this hybrid liberty test.
The argument would go as follows: First, access to clean water is impor-
tant even if not fundamental under the United States Constitution.  It has
earned international human rights status,275 and is beginning to make head-
way in state constitutional law.276  Life—plainly protected by due process—is
impossible without it.  Water is also more critical to life—and thus liberty—
than housing, and more critical to human survival than access to marriage.
Second, the water in Flint was not contaminated at only one location;
the City’s entire water supply was compromised.  The pervasive nature of the
harm, and the fact that the public water supply was the sole water source for
unsuspecting residents lends force to the claim that government created a
profound risk to human life.
Third, the residents of Flint may not be a suspect class per se, but few
would deny the multiple forms of structural and absolute political powerless-
271 Id. at 446–48.
272 Id. at 447–48.
273 Id. at 442–43.
274 They also may qualify as “constitutive commitments”—short of constitutional
requirements but essential legislative responsibilities. See Sharmila L. Murthy, A New Con-
stitutive Commitment to Water, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 159, 201 (2016) (“[T]here is a norma-
tive basis in our existing jurisprudence for finding that water is essential for life.  Because
water plays a unique role in our culture, history and laws, it should be treated as a constitu-
tive commitment deserving of legislative protection.”).
275 See G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶¶ 1, 2 (July 28, 2010); Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 15 (2002) on the Right to Water, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/
2002/11 (Nov. 29, 2002); see also Catarina de Albuquerque (Special Rapporteur on the
Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation), Rep. on the Compilation of Good Prac-
tices, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/33/Add.1 (June 29, 2011).
276 Pennsylvania is leading the way on this and may cut a path for other states if not for
the nation.  Pennsylvania has a constitutional provision that states as follows:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.  Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come.  As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.  In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania invalidated a state law that would have allowed exploitation of the state’s natural
gas resources on the ground that it violated this provision.  83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013)
(plurality opinion).  The plurality opinion shows that courts can navigate the shoals of
constitutionalizing “thick” environmental rights, if motivated to do so.
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ness that they suffered.  None of them voted for the emergency managers
who controlled their water supply decisions.  Most of them are poor.  And
over half of them are African American, which casts an equal protection
shadow over the government actions even if the suspect classification fit here
was imperfect.
Last, the fundamental rights argument was not for clean water per se,
but for freedom from government actions that knowingly and recklessly com-
promise a baseline level of purity with absolutely foreseeable harms to life.
The grim realities of the Flint crisis combined in ways that should have
made the liberty losses look—at the very least—important to an empathic
court, as well as to the nation.  That is, even absent creating a fundamental
right to clean water per se, a court could have concluded that individuals
have an important liberty interest in water without harmful contamination
that was violated under the egregious facts of the case.  The conduct of the
Michigan officials with respect to this important interest was arguably consti-
tutionally irrational, under the hybrid rights approach.  Such a modified
thick rights, or “rational basis with bite” strategy was thus plausible.
The constitutional right that would emerge from this effort to fit the
right into existing law, though, would not be a right to clean water per se.  At
most, it would be a more narrowly defined right that focuses on the nature of
the water contamination, its alleged harms, and the government’s role in
producing these harms.  It would also be highly context specific.
An important case pending in the District of Oregon shows how judges
might bend to this doctrinal argument, despite its complexities.  In a case in
which future generations challenged a range of government action and inac-
tion that threatens the environment on constitutional grounds, the judge
stated the following in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss:
 Defendants and intervenors contend plaintiffs are asserting a right to be
free from pollution or climate change, and that courts have consistently
rejected attempts to define such rights as fundamental, Defendants and
intervenors mischaracterize the right plaintiffs assert.  Plaintiffs do not
object to the government’s role in producing any pollution or in causing any
climate change; rather, they assert the government has caused pollution and
climate change on a catastrophic level, and that if the government’s actions
continue unchecked, they will permanently and irreversibly damage plain-
tiffs’ property, their economic livelihood, their recreational opportunities,
their health, and ultimately their (and their children’s) ability to live long,
healthy lives.  Echoing Obergefell’s reasoning, plaintiffs allege a stable climate
system is a necessary condition to exercising other rights to life, liberty, and
property.277
That is, there may be a fundamental right to a minimum level of envi-
ronmental protection.  Yet as we have explained, distinguishing between a
fundamental right to clean water and a fundamental right not to be given
unreasonably contaminated water through gross disregard for residents’ well-
being is extremely difficult: countless contextual variations would affect the
277 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016).
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determination.  Line drawing would entail scientific and other judgment
calls that may be better left to agencies than to courts.  Moreover, the funda-
mental right that is being developed is not violated unless the harms are
catastrophic and—as the plaintiffs in Flint asserted—government’s conduct
in producing the harms is shocking.
The firmer constitutional path, at least for now, thus may be the thinner
rights strategy described in the following Section.  It focuses more directly
and exclusively on isolating procedural and other lapses by the relevant gov-
ernment actors in a given context that so violate hardened sensibilities that
they shock the conscience.  It does not require courts to assess or measure a
proper level of water quality, clearly unacceptable water impurities, or envi-
ronmental security per se, but to determine whether official disregard of the
known science about water quality or other environmental harms was
shocking.
To be sure, this is an incomplete and still-fuzzy constitutional solution to
the underlying concern about access to clean water that is essential to human
life.  But it is not toothless and would have both expressive and practical con-
sequences that may compel government actors to stop and think when mak-
ing decisions with significant environmental consequences.  It also maintains
a clearer distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental rights, and
the judicial presumptions that divide them.
B. Shocks the Conscience
Flint was an outrage of epic proportion.  Human life, liberty, and prop-
erty were undeniably compromised by grossly irresponsible government acts.
A whole city was effectively poisoned because of official decisions made with
knowledge of the water’s contamination and its potential effects.  The reper-
cussions are still being felt and some—especially for lead-exposed Flint chil-
dren—are likely to be life-lasting.
Baseline constitutional norms demand that government officials not act
with such gross disregard for the public life, liberty, and property.  This con-
clusion is particularly compelling given that Flint’s municipal government
was placed in receivership by the state, such that its citizens were deprived of
meaningful local political representation.
This outrage could be expressed in a constitutional register while tread-
ing carefully, making little new law, and preserving maximum legislative and
administrative discretion to craft and enforce water quality standards.  In this
section, we explain how the court could have responded to the outrageous
conduct in Flint without jimmying doctrine or creating potentially disruptive
judicial oversight of environmental law enforcement.
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1. Due Process Floors
As the foregoing section shows, substantive due process is a contin-
uum—not discrete points of liberty.278  It ranges from the classic examples of
fundamental rights, to liberties in the hybrid category where equality and
liberty concerns intersect, to a baseline expectation of rational and non-arbi-
trary government conduct.
One of us has previously explained why the shocks the conscience test is
an important component of that continuum that protects individuals from
outrageous abuses of government power.279  It applies to the myriad actions
of agencies and their individual agents, whose alleged abuses of power can be
checked in extreme cases.  The test applies only when the executive miscon-
duct is intentional and deliberate,280 and truly shocking.  The test also is part
of a broader constitutional rationality floor: neither due process nor equal
protection is solely defined by fundamental rights and suspect class silos.281
The better view is that the shocks the conscience test may apply even if
no formally identified fundamental right has been violated.  Outrageous
treatment may itself constitute a deprivation of liberty under due process.
This is because due process’s “animating commitment . . . is captured by
perhaps the most persistently recurring theme in due process cases: govern-
ment must not be arbitrary.”282
278 As Justice Harlan noted in Poe v. Ullman,
This ‘liberty’ [guaranteed by the Due Process Clause] is not a series of isolated points
pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and relig-
ion . . . . It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.
367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
279 See Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 207, at 289–91.
280 See, e.g., Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 210 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that
“[t]he state of mind of a government defendant is an integral aspect of any ‘shock the
conscience’ standard” and requires more than negligence); People v. Uribe, 132 Cal. Rptr.
3d 102, 125 (Ct. App. 2011).
281 See SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 176, at 166 (noting that “[d]ue process today is
part of an astounding mosaic of reconceived constitutional rights, rights that are best read
as reconstitutive and interdependent rather than as silos of protection, narrowly
understood”).
282 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 322–23 (1993).  For this reason, among others,
equal protection arbitrariness is a subspecies of due process irrationality.  The Court has
also observed that due process and equal protection are “connected in a profound way,
though they set forth independent principles. . . . [I]n some instances each may be instruc-
tive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603
(2015).  Even more fundamentally, there is no equal protection clause in the Bill of Rights.
Equal protection binds the federal government through judicial interpretations of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and its dynamic relationship to the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954); see
also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
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2. Rochin v. California
The shocks the conscience test derives from Rochin v. California,283
decided over sixty years ago.  Los Angeles County sheriff deputies entered
Rochin’s house,284 burst into his bedroom, and observed two capsules.
When one of the deputies asked, “Whose stuff is this?” Rochin ingested the
capsules.285  The officials took Rochin to the hospital and forcibly pumped
his stomach until he vomited the capsules.286
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that the official did “more than offend
some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting
crime too energetically.  This is conduct that shocks the conscience.”287
Frankfurter further stated that, “In dealing not with the machinery of govern-
ment but with human rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of
fixity of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitu-
tional provisions.”288  Rather, this is a matter of judicial judgment, based on
“considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of
the legal profession.”289  As he put it, a shocks the conscience due process
boundary on executive conduct is “historic and generative.”290
Rochin applies only to misconduct that nearly everyone would agree is
wrong.291  Arbitrary and irrational conduct is not necessarily outrageous
under this test, but must also shock the conscience.292
283 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
284 Id. at 166.
285 Id.
286 Id.; see Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 207, at 288–90.
287 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.  Justice Frankfurter was no judicial activist in this respect.
He was quite wary of judicial extensions of substantive due process to include vague rights.
See Wallace Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Process of Judicial Review, 103 U. PA. L.
REV. 295 (1954) (discussing Frankfurter’s judicially conservative, though not hidebound
philosophy).
288 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
289 Id. at 171.
290 Id. at 173; see Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 207, at 288–90 (discussing Rochin).
291 As one court has put it, “before a constitutional infringement occurs, state action
must in and of itself be egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking.”
Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1990).
292 See, e.g., Pyles v. Vill. of Manteno, No. 13-CV-2114, 2014 WL 793531, at *5 (C.D. Ill.
Feb. 26, 2014) (finding that a failure to disclose evidence in order to indict plaintiff satis-
fied the test).
In Zotos v. Town of Hingham, the federal district court noted that “in order to demonstrate
conduct that ‘shocks the conscience[,]’ a plaintiff must present ‘“stunning” evidence of
“arbitrariness and caprice” that extends beyond “[m]ere violations of state law, even viola-
tions resulting from bad faith” to “something more egregious and more extreme.”‘“  No.
12-11126, 2013 WL5328478, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 2013) (alterations in original) (quot-
ing J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010)); see also Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d
789, 791 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995) (describing the test as a “virtually insurmountable uphill
struggle”).
For example, in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, the Court concluded the shocks the con-
science standard was not violated when a city failed to train or warn city workers about
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Despite its restrained use by judges, the shocks the conscience test has
been much-criticized.293  It aggravates in particular those who abhor tests
that are unmoored in specific constitutional text and history, and that allow
judges to exercise discretion.294  Moreover, critics worry courts may overstep
their institutional authority if they begin to second-guess government officials
in other administrative or legislative settings that should not be subject to
close judicial oversight.295  The test thus often “lurks Boo Radley-like in the
asphyxiation dangers, and a sewer worker died while attempting to clear an underground
sewer line.  503 U.S. 115 (1992).  In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the standard was not
violated when a deputy sheriff pursued a motorcyclist at 100 miles per hour through a
residential neighborhood, at a distance of 100 feet.  523 U.S. 833, 836–37 (1998). See gener-
ally Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 207, at 290–97 (discussing applications of Rochin).
Outrageousness claims also face a significant but obscure doctrinal obstacle derived from
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  For a discussion of Graham and an explanation of
why it should not foreclose application of Rochin, see Bambauer & Massaro, supra note
207, at 318–21; Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot” Account of
Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1086–87 (1998); see also Michael J. Zydney
Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57,
76–86 (2002).
293 See Bambauer & Massaro supra note 207, at 331–36 (discussing critiques).
294 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
Also, scholars and jurists who regard due process as properly about only procedural due
process are, naturally, dubious about all of the caselaw that imposes substantive due pro-
cess limits on the states—fundamental and nonfundamental rights, enumerated and
unenumerated. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (calling it a “momentous sham”); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) (describing it as a “con-
tradiction in terms”); Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045,
1059 (1997) (stating that neither the text nor the intentions of the Framers supports sub-
stantive due process); see also Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (describ-
ing substantive due process as an “oxymoron”).  The current Court has one substantive
due process denier in Justice Thomas, who maintains that due process should only protect
procedural and not substantive rights.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (arguing that the Second Amendment applies to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, not its
Due Process Clause).  Justice Scalia also held this view. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I reject the proposition that the Due Process
Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guarantees certain
procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.”).
295 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520–21 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here is no provision of the Constitution which either expressly or impliedly vests
power in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted legislative
bodies and set aside their laws because of the Court’s belief that the legislative policies
adopted are unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational.  The adoption of
such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional . . . will
amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which . . . will be bad for
the courts and worse for the country.  Subjecting federal and state laws to such an unre-
strained and unrestrainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments
would . . . jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that the Framers set up and at
the same time threaten to take away much of the power of States to govern themselves
which the Constitution plainly intended them to have.”); see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
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[doctrinal] shadows, [and is] very rarely called into service.”296  Yet the test
persists and is occasionally held to be satisfied.297
Some of these cases distinguish between scenarios in which executive
officials must act rapidly and ones in which there is time for deliberation.
When executive officers did not have time to deliberate, their actions will
shock the conscience only if the officers acted with a purpose to cause harm
that is unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement interest.298  For example,
officers in County of Sacramento v. Lewis were involved in a high-speed police
pursuit that caused bodily harm, but did not have a realistic opportunity to
deliberate.299  The Court held that their actions did not violate substantive
due process because they did not act with a purpose to cause harm which was
unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement interest, and because the situation
was one that called for “fast action.”300  Where time to deliberate does exist,
however, officials may violate the shocks the conscience test more readily.
Moreover, the rigid formalisms that pervade other due process and
equal protection zones should not hobble the shocks the conscience test.  It
is an open-ended, but last resort emergency cord.  It therefore offers an alter-
native to expanding unenumerated fundamental constitutional rights or sus-
pect classifications that avoids concretizing results beyond the facts of the
case.
3. Flint Outrage
The official actions in Flint met this high level of misconduct.  Outrage
was the uniform reaction to this debacle.  The officials were not engaged in a
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing
that history indicates judicial review is not intended to be the primary means of interpret-
ing the Constitution); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 155 (2006) (“Real-world decisionmakers, including
judges, have limited capacity to understand and use even the information they do have.
The problem of bounded information is amplified by bounded decisionmaking
capacity.”).
296 Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 207, at 342.
297 For example, “an officer’s use of false evidence to secure a conviction is capable of
shocking the conscience.”  White v. Smith, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1242 (D. Neb. 2011).
Law enforcement conduct likewise shocked the conscience where an arrestee extracted
drugs from her own vagina, but only after police threatened that they would extract them
involuntarily and claimed falsely that they had a search warrant to transport her to a local
hospital for that purpose. United States v. Anderson, No. 5:13-cr-24, 2013 WL 5769976,
*5–6 (D. Vt. Oct. 24, 2013), rev’d, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014).  And when a high school
coach deliberately struck a student with a heavy object and blinded her in one eye, this
shocked the conscience.  Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1076
(11th Cir. 2000).  Finally, “when a police officer not faced with an emergency drives his vehicle
through a red light at sixty-four miles per hour on a dark and snowy winter night and kills
an innocent seventeen year-old girl, such actions rise to the level of conscience-shocking.”
Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 985 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting).
298 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).
299 Id.
300 Id. at 852–53.
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high-speed chase or other situation demanding split-second decisions.  Flint
also involved bodily harms, which have been described as a core liberty
concern.301
Flint was a worst-case scenario.  Recall that compelling Mr. Rochin to
vomit shocked the conscience.  Had the Flint residents been told by the City
that their drinking water contained lead, surely they too would have contem-
plated vomiting to expel the contaminated water from their bodies.  Parents
of young children would have been even more distressed, given that elevated
lead levels are more dangerous to children and can inflict permanent, seri-
ous damage.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine just how frightened and out-
raged the Flint parents felt after learning their children were so exposed.
And of course they continue to live with the knowledge that their children
may suffer lifelong injuries because of this debacle.
But there was more.  That the injuries here were so structural and perva-
sive that they evaded the tidy silos of fundamental rights and suspect classes
made this situation exceptionally horrifying.  Again, that everything was wrong
in Flint should not mean nothing was.
The more widespread a government-inflicted injury, the more sanguine
courts usually can be that the political process is an adequate remedy.  There
is some constitutional safety in numbers.  But in Flint the opposite was true.
All of the residents were affected, but all were effectively disen-
franchised.  Flint no longer was their town; recall that it was governed by the
state-appointed, unelected emergency manager.  Moreover, residents could
not reasonably have expected that it was essential for them to be on alert
from the government knowingly allowing poison to flow in the public drink-
ing water.  Such outre´ and devastating decisions should not be insulated
from constitutional scrutiny on the ground that the political process was an
adequate check on abuse.
When government actions elide existing formal categories yet inflict
foreseeable and grave bodily, property, and psychological harms that could
have been prevented with available, cost-effective measures, courts should
pull the due process emergency cord.  The shocks the conscience test
empowers them to call out these officials on constitutional grounds even if
they are unwilling to declare that the liberty at stake was a fundamental right.
301 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); see also Martinez v. City of Oxnard,
337 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (allowing a due process claim where
plaintiff alleged that officer interfered with medical treatment of plaintiff while screaming
in pain); Bounds v. Hanneman, No. 13-266, 2014 WL 1303715, at *9 (D. Minn. Mar. 31,
2014) (holding that the plaintiff properly stated a claim of substantive due process where
DRE officer trainees recruited citizens to smoke large amounts of marijuana for purposes
of observational training of officers, where there were allegations that police threatened
citizens with arrest if they did not participate, on grounds that this was invasion of bodily
integrity that shocked the conscience); Callaway v. N.J. State Police Troop A, No. 12-5477,
2013 WL 1431668, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2013) (noting that “conscience shocking” typically
provides relief in cases of physical abuse).
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C. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause issues intersect with the due process funda-
mental rights issues.  Here again, the plaintiffs’ claims confronted numerous
doctrinal hurdles.302
1. Intent
The first is the question of government intent.  In the State’s mind, this
requirement was not met because the State had no purpose to harm Flint
residents.303
The State was incorrect as a matter of doctrine.  The State clearly had
the intent to redirect Flint residents to Flint River sources.  It is not the intent
to harm that is key to equal protection analysis; it is the intent to deploy a
classification.304  The classification here was Flint residents.
That a harm ensued matters to an equal protection violation; but harms
may flow from a classification without more, as is true of intentional govern-
ment use of a racial classification.305  And in the case of Flint, harm plainly
occurred to the residents.
2. Suspect Classifications
The next question is whether the government classification, with respect
to this resource decision, implicated a suspect class or involved a fundamen-
tal right.  If not, the government classification triggers only the flaccid
rational basis test.306
The interdependence of fundamental rights analysis and equal protec-
tion analysis should lead the court to similar results under each test.  If the
right at stake is not fundamental or otherwise deserving of elevated judicial
scrutiny, then only rational basis applies under due process.  And if the
302 Experienced environmental justice advocates have concluded that equal protection
claims are extremely difficult to pursue. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litiga-
tion: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 526 (1994) (stating equal
protection is a low priority theory in such cases).
303 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 2, 29, 41, 45, 57.
304 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI, 1 STATE ENVIRONMENTAL L. § 5:15 (2016).
305 Intentional use of the classification by government triggers strict scrutiny, regardless
of whether the goal was to assist underrepresented groups. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
306 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–89 (1955) (describ-
ing the rational basis baseline).  As the Court stated in Nordlinger v. Hahn, “The Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid classifications.  It simply keeps governmental deci-
sionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”  505
U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (citing F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
The rational basis test is satisfied if there is “a plausible policy reason for the classification,
the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been
considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the
classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irra-
tional.” Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
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residents of Flint are not a suspect class, then only rational basis applies
under equal protection.  The only caveat to this is that equal protection scru-
tiny rises as the liberty interest underlying due process becomes more signifi-
cant, if not fundamental.
Put simply, plaintiffs thus need to show either that denial of clean water
here implicated a fundamental (or at least hybrid) right, or that Flint
residents are a suspect class, in order to trigger elevated scrutiny under equal
protection.  If plaintiffs cannot do so, then the rational basis test applies.
This shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiffs to show there was no conceiv-
able rational basis for the decision to use Flint River water for Flint
residents.307  This asserted rational basis need not have been the real reason
for the decision: it may be asserted post hoc.308
All of the residents of a city—even one racially stratified and pocked by
poverty, crime, and health risks—do not qualify as a suspect class.  And a
disparate impact is not enough to show intent to discriminate.309  Perhaps
they should qualify for suspect-class status under a theory of structural
powerlessness and racism.310  But at present, they do not.  Thus the plaintiffs
307 See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (reaffirming that there is a “strong
presumption of validity” that the party challenging the law must overcome).
308 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[I]t is entirely
irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged
distinction actually motivated the legislature.”).
309 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(finding that impact is relevant to, but not dispositive of intent); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that plaintiff must show a discriminatory purpose).  Efforts to
use equal protection in cases that involved the siting of environmentally harmful industries
typically failed for this reason. See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., No. Civ.A. 01-702, 2006 WL 1097498 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006); Cox v. City of Dallas, No.
Civ.A.3:98-CV-1763, 2004 WL 2108253 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2004), aff’d, 430 F.3d 734 (5th
Cir. 2005); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff’d, 977 F.2d 573 (4th
Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb Cty. Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff’d, 888 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1989), abrogated
by 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.
Tex. 1979), aff’d without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
310 See Peter J. Hammer, The Flint Water Crisis, KWA and Strategic-Structural Racism
(Wayne State Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-17, 2016), https://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2812171. See generally LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA
R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001); THE STRUGGLE FOR ECOLOGICAL DEMOCRACY: ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Daniel Faber ed., 1998); Michelle
Wilde Anderson & Victoria C. Plaut, Property Law: Implicit Bias and the Resilience of Spatial
Colorlines, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 25–44 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J.
Smith eds., 2012); CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993); Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism:
Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219 (1998); Sheila Foster, Justice From the
Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the
Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1998); Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy
of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681 (2000); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Advancing
Environmental Justice Norms, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95 (2003); Gerald Torres, Understanding
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must satisfy the demanding rational basis test requirements, or find another
route to higher equal protection ground.  The higher ground would depend
on whether they succeeded in establishing a fundamental or hybrid right.  As
we have explained, this is very tough sledding.
Yet again, equal protection caselaw includes examples that defy categori-
zation.  Hybrid cases exist, and may offer plausible analogies here.311  The
disabled are not a suspect class per se, yet the Court struck down a zoning
ordinance that affected them intentionally and adversely.312  Sexual orienta-
tion is not a suspect classification per se, and marriage may traditionally
include only opposite-sex couples, yet denying same-sex couples access to
marriage violates due process given the intersection of liberty and
equality.313
Moreover, even if access to uncontaminated water is not fundamental in
the due process liberty sense, it is undeniably profound.  And even if Flint
residents are not a formal suspect class, their lives are hobbled by poverty,
racial injustice, and political powerlessness in ways that contributed to the
Flint water debacle.  Stark differences in public services have in some cases
been enough to trigger closer scrutiny and for courts to infer discriminatory
intent.314  So it may be here.
Also, as we have explained, the United States Supreme Court is slowly
moving away from tradition-bound formalism as its guiding liberty principle
in favor of an evolving-liberty spectrum in which inequality plays an impor-
tant role.315  Here too, the recent same-sex marriage cases are instructive and
suggest that liberty and equality are intertwined: where the liberty denials
also raise serious equality concerns they are more grave and potentially wor-
thy of constitutional attention.316
Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992); cf. David A. Dana & Deborah
Tuerkheimer, After Flint: Environmental Justice as Equal Protection, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 879
(2017) (arguing that underenforcement of environmental laws should violate equal
protection).
311 See Justice O’Connor’s observation in Lawrence v. Texas that statutes based on ani-
mus may be subject to “a more searching form of rational basis review.”  539 U.S. 558, 580
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional
Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 (2014) (discuss-
ing rational basis review under equal protection caselaw and concluding it is a meaningful,
nonaberrational form of judicial review).
312 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
313 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015).
314 See Sten-Erik Hoidal, Note, Returning to the Roots of Environmental Justice: Lessons from
the Inequitable Distribution of Municipal Services, 88 MINN. L. REV. 193 (2003) (discussing cases
and how litigants might show the requisite intent).
315 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (noting that liberty and equality are intertwined).
316 Id.
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Efforts to identify the poor as a suspect class are obviously not new,317
but are no less powerful than when they were first advanced.318  The Court
has noted in the voting rights context that that “[l]ines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”319  Gov-
ernment action that falls directly, foreseeably, and harshly on the poor with
respect to basic needs thus may ring equality alarms.  Likewise, compelling
work on the intersectionality of poverty and other suspect classifications, like
race and gender,320 offers insight into the structural discrimination Flint
residents face.
Flint’s woes are particularly dreadful and notorious.  Documentaries like
Roger & Me, by Michael Moore,321 have drawn national attention to the city’s
plight for many years.322  Moore’s focus there was on the withdrawal of the
automotive industry from Flint and the adverse economic consequences
thereof.  But a miserable olio ails Flint—poverty, high crime, political
powerlessness, poor physical and mental health outcomes, crumbling
schools, high dropout rates, and economic desolation.  These sociopolitical
pathologies are not susceptible to clean doctrinal parsing.  That is, a “rational
basis with bite” test could have been applied to the Flint case.
Nevertheless, the doctrinal current runs briskly against elevated judicial
scrutiny of any form when the offending classification is not crisp and has not
formally been deemed to be “suspect.”  The “whole town” and “many causes”
aspect of the suspect class argument surely would worry a judge.  Zip codes
often send strong, determinative signals of inequality, but zip code–sensitive
government conduct still does not trigger strict scrutiny.
Judges must also worry about precedent.  Flint is in a wretched way, to be
sure.  But its exquisite municipal agony is not unique.  Other American cities
too are suffering from similar forms of structural injustice and some teeter
317 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting argument that educational funding scheme based on local prop-
erty taxes triggered strict scrutiny and had created a suspect class based on poverty).
318 See Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation, in FREEDOM FROM POV-
ERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? 11–53 (Thomas Pogge ed.,
2007).
319 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (citation omitted) (striking
down poll tax).
320 See, e.g., Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersec-
tionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 991, 991 (2011) (analyzing impact of
intersectional demographic characteristics on odds of plaintiff victory).  See generally
Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Kimberle´ Williams Crenshaw, Panel
Presentation on Cultural Battery Speaker: Kimberle´ Williams Crenshaw, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 891
(1994).
321 ROGER & ME (Dog Eat Dog Films 1989).
322 Moore also has focused on the Flint water crisis. See Michael Moore, 10 Things They
Won’t Tell You About the Flint Water Tragedy. But I Will., http://michaelmoore.com/10Facts
OnFlint/.
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on the brink of failure.323  Treating Flint residents as a suspect class per se
thus may open a Pandora’s box.
Third, the multiple-vectors aspect of Flint’s agony—poverty and race and
crumbling economic and water supply infrastructure, and more—com-
pounded the complexities.  Judges may lack the expertise to second-guess
local and state decisionmakers in these cases, and may be unable to craft
remedies to address the intricate causes.  The more structural, political, and
intersectional the social problem, the less useful courtroom tools often are to
solve it.  Also, other limitations are inherent in a judicial strategy, including
the loss of democratic input into the content of rights.324  The district judge
sitting in Detroit surely knew this.
Last, municipalities with this level of poverty and other intersecting
problems should be singled out and treated differently from others in order
to assist them in reconstituting their government, rebuilding their commu-
nity, and escaping their severe distress.  Suspect-class status for Flint would
have meant that all regulations that treat Flint differently from other Gene-
see County cities should trigger rigorous judicial scrutiny.  If greater state
benefits flowed solely to Flint, the argument would go, then other towns with
arguably similar problems should have a plausible equal protection claim.
The potential boomerang effect of a zip-code victory in Flint should give
those seeking environmental justice pause.  The shelter of zip code—or even
race and poverty—government classifications may be necessary in order to
effectively redress environmental injustice that travels along zip code, race,
and poverty lines.  Strict scrutiny of such measures may do more harm than
good to efforts to eradicate such injustice.325
For all of these reasons, elevated scrutiny under equal protection may be
ill-fitting, if not unwise.  The rational basis test is the applicable fall back stan-
dard.  But again, the better place to locate the argument that baseline consti-
tutionality requirements were not met in Flint was under the closely related
323 See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014)
(describing dozens of cities in receivership).
324 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1349–50 (2006) (arguing that judicial review makes citizens feel disconnected from
critical decisions involving their rights). But see JACOB WEINRIB, DIMENSIONS OF DIGNITY:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (2016) (offering an
extended argument in favor of constitutionalism as a means of making public authority
accountable “to the human dignity of each and every person subject to law’s authority”).
325 For a discussion of how government may use race—and poverty—conscious mea-
sures to redress environmental injustice without triggering strict scrutiny, see Sheila R.
Foster, Environmental Justice and the Constitution, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10347, 10349  (2009)
(noting “it may be true that courts would tolerate the ‘race-consciousness’ of environmen-
tal justice policies that express concern for the environmental health of racial minority
populations and communities because they emanate from and are applied as a matter of
core legislative or executive functions”); cf. Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Canary-Blind Constitu-
tion: Must Government Ignore Racial Inequality?, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2016) (arguing
that current doctrine may even prevent government from acting to redress racial inequality
with race-neutral means).
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shocks the conscience test, for reasons provided in the foregoing section.326
It required the least structural change to doctrine and afforded nonjudicial
government actors ample breathing room to develop sound environmental
policy and to adopt poverty-conscious measures designed to relieve the mis-
ery of especially hard hit communities.  It thus could have played an impor-
tant role in enforcing a constitutional liberty/equality baseline without
creating a fundamental right that would send courts into uncharted waters
prematurely.  More fundamentally, it may have worked where the other
thicker rights theories failed.
D. Preemption
The district judge in Mays took another path.  He concluded, as he did
in a related action, that the Safe Drinking Water Act preempted the constitu-
tional claims, on the theory that they were basically about insisting that gov-
ernment provide clean water.327
The district court erred and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
correctly reversed on this point.328  In Smith v. Robinson,329 the Supreme
Court concluded that the “carefully tailored administrative and judicial
mechanism” of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)
reflected congressional intent that the Act be “the exclusive avenue through
which a plaintiff may assert . . . an equal protection claim to a publicly
financed special education.”330
Courts have been reluctant to apply Smith in other contexts in which
parties invoked Section 1983 to assert constitutional versus statutory argu-
326 Even had the shocks the conscience theory prevailed, as we suggest it should have,
the plaintiffs faced several serious obstacles to recovery, including sovereign immunity, offi-
cial immunity, and statutory preemption issues that arguably preclude application of 42
U.S.C. 1983.  These procedural nuances are beyond the scope of this paper, but were rea-
sons given by lawyers who declined to step in to represent plaintiffs in this context. See
Bernstein & Dennis, supra note 162.
327 Mays v. Snyder, No. 15-cv-14002, 2017 WL 445637, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2017) (order of
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). According to the judge, “The essence of
Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims is that Plaintiffs were injured as a result of exposure to
contaminated water.  Plaintiffs’ allegations are addressed by regulations that have been
promulgated by the EPA under the SDWA,” and “the safety of public water systems is a
field occupied by the SDWA.  Accordingly . . . the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ federal
remedy is under the SDWA, regardless of how their legal theories are characterized in the
complaint.” Id. at *2 (citations omitted).  The judge relied upon his ruling in Boler v.
Earley dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing Boler v. Earley, No. 16-
10323, 2016 WL 1573272 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 865 F.3d 391
(6th Cir. 2017)).
328 Boler, 865 F.3d 391 (consolidating Boler and Mays v. Snyder, dismissing the state
defendants on immunity grounds, and remanding cases for further proceedings against
remaining individual defendants).
329 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
330 Id. at 1009.
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ments, despite the fact that Smith itself involved an equal protection claim.331
Moreover, the Court cast doubt on whether Smith applies in cases where Sec-
tion 1983 is invoked to assert constitutional rights in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable
School Committee.332  In any event, Smith requires that the statute that allegedly
preempts a Section 1983 claim must secure rights that are “virtually identi-
cal”333 to the constitutional right, and must provide a comprehensive reme-
dial scheme.334
Most important is that the plaintiffs’ constitutional allegations went well
beyond any claim that they were denied access to clean water in ways that the
federal statutes enforce.  They claimed that the government intentionally
and outrageously provided contaminated water despite citizen outcries and
actual notice that something was seriously wrong with the water.  To lop off
plaintiffs’ opportunity to raise these civil constitutional claims because fed-
eral environmental laws cover the subject matter of clean water would insu-
late the government actors from full accountability, no less than denying the
state the right to proceed against some of these officials under criminal laws
would insulate them from accountability.  Also, the ultimate issue is one of
congressional intent.  There is no evidence that the SDWA can properly be
read as congressional withdrawal of access to Section 1983 to assert violations
of due process and equal protection. Finally, the SDWA and Section 1983 diverge
in multiple ways that point against the virtual-identity requirement for pre-
emption of Section 1983 claims.
IV. BEYOND FLINT
Identifying and judicially enforcing a due process baseline in environ-
mental harm cases makes doctrinal and normative sense.  Flint offered courts
an opportunity to underscore and respect that baseline.  Other courts have
already indicated that they may be receptive to the claim that the shocks the
conscience baseline should rein in authorities in environmental cases.335
The nuts and bolts of this strategy would be for the court to follow the
FWATF Report’s outline of the key actors responsible for the crisis,336 to state
331 See Employment Law—Age Discrimination—Seventh Circuit Holds that the ADEA Does Not
Preclude § 1983 Equal Protection Claims.—Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012), 126
HARV. L. REV. 1414 (2013).
332 555 U.S. 246, 258 (2009).
333 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1003, 1009.
334 Id. at 992.
335 For example, in Juliana v. United States, Magistrate Judge Coffin refused to dismiss a
suit alleging that the government’s action and inaction with respect to carbon pollution
violated substantive due process rights on grounds that the government conduct may have
shocked the conscience.  Order and Findings & Recommendation, Juliana v. United States,
No. 6:15-cv-1517 (D. Or. April 8, 2016) (noting that fundamental rights to life, liberty, and
property may have been violated in manner that shocks the conscience, and also relying on
the public trust doctrine).  This ruling was upheld by the federal district court judge. See
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (ruling on Motion to Dismiss);
see also supra note 277 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 135–57 and accompanying text.
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why their knowing disregard of the water quality deficiencies shocked the
conscience, and to impose the Flint-specific prospective remedies requested
by the plaintiffs but with due regard for the steps already undertaken by the
state.  Duplicate efforts would not be required, but the court could have con-
tinued to monitor the crisis until the steps were completed.  The judicial
intervention would be more complex than ordering that a particular execu-
tive actor no longer engage in shocking acts with respect to an arrestee—as
was the case in Rochin—but it would be no more judicially unmanageable to
right the ongoing wrong in this specific context than to redress the harms in
a mass tort case.  The additional feature here was that the court would have
labeled the government default appropriately: as a constitutional wrong of
epic proportion, not merely a statutory or common-law tort wrong.
Doing so would not transform constitutional law into tort law.  The
severe limitations of the shocks the conscience theory make such argu-
ments—which are routine in cases where tort and constitutional law may
overlap—overwrought.  The advantages of the shocks the conscience test
include its limited applicability.
Doing so also would not mean that a fundamental right to some level of
environmental security could not emerge, or that courts could not revisit
notions of equal protection that better protect the poor and disenfranchised
from foreseeable government inflicted harms.  These arguments may con-
tinue to percolate and may eventually ripen into formal constitutional
categories.
Nor would enforcing a liberty baseline ignore the urgent need for non-
judicial remedies, or romanticize the effectiveness of courts versus these
other strategies in fixing what ails Flint.  The state actors in Mays argued that,
“this federal lawsuit is the wrong vehicle to [solve Flint’s water crisis].”337  But
this facially appealing argument had two obvious flaws.  First was that the
judiciary can reinforce other remedies, as well as act interstitially when such
remedies fail.  Second was that the argument in favor of legislative and
administrative remedies depends on legislative and administrative will to pro-
vide them.338
337 Mays Motion to Dismiss, supra note 165, at 1 (emphasis added).
338 While President-elect Trump pledged the following immediate actions:
—[L]ift the restrictions on the production of $50 trillion dollars’ worth of job-
producing American energy reserves, including shale, oil, natural gas and clean
coal. . . .
—[L]ift the Obama-Clinton roadblocks and allow vital energy infrastructure
projects, like the Keystone Pipeline, to move forward. . . .
—[C]ancel billions in payments to U.N. climate change programs and use the
money to fix America’s water and environmental infrastructure.
Amita Kelly & Barbara Sprunt, Here Is What Donald Trump Wants To Do in His First 100 Days,
NPR (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/11/09/501451368/here-is-what-donald-
trump-wants-to-do-in-his-first-100-days.  He also pledged to “cancel every unconstitutional
executive . . . order” signed by President Obama. See id.; see also Coral Davenport, Donald
Trump Could Put Climate Change on Course for ‘Danger Zone,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/donald-trump-climate-change.html
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President Trump ran on a platform of rejecting the environmental mea-
sures adopted by his predecessors.339  Although he also pledged to address
the nation’s profound infrastructure concerns340—which obviously affect
water quality, as Flint shows—the prospects of national overhaul may dim
when the staggering price of such an overhaul is fully measured.341  Cost and
economic trade-offs are a bipartisan concern, as are the federalism implica-
tions of federal environmental regulation.  On the other hand, there was
overwhelming bipartisan support for the passage of the Water Infrastructure
Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act, during the closing month of
2016.342  Thus, much remains to be seen as to the direction of agenda-setting
for environmental law at the national level.  Yet regardless of the particular
agenda embraced by the Trump Administration, courts will remain critical in
redressing the worst environmental crises on a national level and will necessa-
rily play a role in interpreting and enforcing the existing laws.
Of course, even the thin rights strategy we propose here will face stiff
headwinds.  Newly appointed Justice Gorsuch may join the justices who are
skeptical of thin rights, as well as of evolving notions of liberty and equal
protection.  Lower court judges too may balk at this constitutional strategy,
or fear its complexities in implementation.  Nevertheless, we speculate that
these thin due process claims will fare better before the Court than thicker,
fundamental rights–based claims regarding uncontaminated water or “sus-
pect classification”–based arguments on behalf of poor and disadvantaged
(“Mr. Trump and other Republicans have attacked the Clean Power Plan as a ‘war on coal.’
As president, Mr. Trump would not have the legal authority to unilaterally undo the regu-
lations, which were put forth by the E.P.A. under a provision of the 1970 Clean Air Act.
However, Mr. Trump could target the rules by appointing an industry-friendly justice to
the Supreme Court and then refusing to defend the plan when it goes before the court.
He could also direct the E.P.A. to reissue the plan to be extremely friendly to industry.”).
339 See Michael D. Shear & Gardiner Harris, Trump Wants to ‘Drain the Swamp,’ but
Change Will Be Complex and Costly, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/11/us/politics/trump-government.html (noting that Trump pledged to shut
down the EPA while campaigning).
340 See David Harrison, Donald Trump’s Infrastructure Plan Faces Speed Bumps, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumps-infrastructure-plan-faces-
speed-bumps-1478884989?emailToken=JRr8fvxzY3yUhNAxacww01shaqVNF/WUQ0vMaX
HMNFLFr2DPvOm92r84wsOzqGXqS09x6stB9HYySDGUindvRNTUwuIgwQf0JygN/w==.
341 See Russell Berman, Trump Tries to Bend Republicans on Infrastructure, ATLANTIC (Nov.
15, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/trumps-infrastructure-
challenge-to-republicans/507656/.
342 Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, 130
Stat. 1628 (2016).  The WIIN Act aims to address the needs of America’s harbors, locks,
dams, flood protection, and other water resources infrastructure.  It includes the Water
Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 2016, which supports the missions of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in overseeing the nation’s water infrastructure.  The
WIIN Act includes provisions aimed at improving drinking water infrastructure around the
country, addressing control of coal combustion residuals, and improving water storage and
delivery to help drought stricken communities.  The legislation included the critical fund-
ing for Flint, Michigan.
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communities.  In any event, they may be paired with the fundamental rights
arguments, as plaintiffs attempted to do in Mays.
Finally, the shocks the conscience strategy may be well suited to a politi-
cal culture that responds to issues that have emotional content.343  Shocks
the conscience cases that include vivid images of the sickeningly contami-
nated water, the ill communities (especially the children within them), and
the hapless government actors who had knowledge but failed to act respon-
sibly, might help inspire judicial action.  Likewise, a well-told and widely pub-
licized courtroom narrative that underscores not just the legal issues but also
the outrageous human consequences of government default may propel
lawmakers into action.
One thing is clear.  The urgency of addressing clean water will be diffi-
cult for courts and policymakers to ignore.  Flint is merely an ominous tip of
a very large and growing iceberg.344  One Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil (NRDC) report suggests that millions of Americans may be exposed to
unsafe lead levels.345  Lead poisoning and other serious water quality risks
have been reported in East Chicago, Indiana,346 Hoosick Falls, New York,347
343 For an intriguing new analysis of how human emotions influence political predispo-
sitions in ways that may explain cultural divides as well as places of union, see JONATHAN
HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION
(2012).
344 For a masterful analysis of the problem of distressed cities in the United States, and
how their distress places pressure on their ability to provide basic public services like water,
see Anderson, supra note 323.  Anderson argues for a warranty of habitability of urban
centers. Id. at 1197–99.  Habitability requires, inter alia, attention to crumbling sewer sys-
tems. Id. at 1201–02; see also Martha F. Davis, Let Justice Roll Down: A Case Study of the Legal
Infrastructure for Water Equality and Affordability, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 355
(2016) (arguing for a civil rights approach to escalating concerns about equal access to
clean water).  Yet we should resist resorting to a misleading shorthand of referring to these
problems as “inner city” problems.  First, they are more pervasive.  Second, not all cities are
suffering or suffering in the same ways. See Emily Badger, Actually, Many ‘Inner Cities’ Are
Doing Great, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/polit-
ics/trump-government.html.
345 ERIK OLSON & KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHAT’S IN YOUR
WATER? FLINT AND BEYOND (2016), https://nrdc.org/sites/default/files/whats-in-your-
water-flint-beyond-report.pdf (reporting that EPA data show that 5363 water systems, which
provide water to more than 18 million people, breached the federal Lead and Copper Rule
in 2015, and that violations include the failure to properly test water for lead or inadequate
treatment of water to prevent lead from leeching from old pipes into the drinking supply);
see also Lecia Bushak, A Brief History of Lead Poisoning in Major Cities, MED. DAILY (June 8,
2016), 2016 WLNR 17656263; Joan B. Rose, America’s Water Crisis Could Be Worse than You
Know, TIME (Mar. 22, 2016), http://time.com/4266919/americas-water-crisis/?xid =email-
share (discussing widespread concerns about decaying infrastructure and effect on safe
water supplies).
346 See Abby Goodnough, Their Soil Toxic, 1,100 Indiana Residents Scramble to Find New
Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/us/lead-con-
tamination-public-housing-east-chicago-indiana.html.
347 See Bennett Liebman, Removing the Lead from Upstate New York, GOV’T REFORM (Apr.
12, 2016), https://governmentreform.wordpress .com/2016/04/12/removing-the-lead-
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and elsewhere.348  As noted water law expert Robert Glennon has observed,
“Across America, water and sewer plants, pipes, and valves are reaching or
beyond the end of their useful lives. . . . Flint officials acted no differently
than those in thousands of other communities—high- and low-income—who
are neglecting the promise of government that all residents have the right to
clean water.”349  Flint thus is not unique in its toxic combination of govern-
ment ineptitude and multivectored resident vulnerability.
Also, Flint is not unique in its fiscal distress.  Several local governments
in Michigan are facing acute financial crises.  In Detroit, the Public School
District’s emergency manager in 2011 planned to close half of the district
schools, which press reports estimate would have resulted in class sizes of
sixty students.350  The staggering financial woes of Detroit Public Schools
have not eased.  Cities in financial distress with crumbling infrastructures,
weak economies, and ensuing environmental crises are hardly Michigan-only
problems.351
from-upstate-new-york/; Jesse McKinley, Fears About Water Supply Grip Village that Made
Teflon Products, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/nyre-
gion/fears-about-water-supply-grip-village-that-made-teflon-products.html.
348 See Nives Dols˘ak & Aseem Prakash, It’s Not Just Flint: Here’s Why We Ignore Water Pollu-
tion, WASH. POST (June 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/
wp/2016/06/08/flints-contamination-and-victorias-secrets-heres-why-we-ignore-water-pol-
lution/?utm_term=.a404927ab032; Tyler J. Kelley, Choke Point of a Nation: The High Cost of
an Aging River Lock, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/23/
business/economy/desperately-plugging-holes-in-an-87-year-old-dam.html; Kris Maher,
Pittsburgh Tries to Avoid Becoming the Next Flint, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2017), Pittsburgh%20
Tries%20to%20Avoid%20Becoming%20the%20Next%20Flint%20-%20WSJ.htmPitts
burgh%20Tries%20to%20Avoid%20Becoming%20the%20Next%20Flint%20-%20WSJ
.htm; Ohio Water System Operator Failed to Notify Public of Unsafe Lead Levels, GUARDIAN (Jan.
25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/25/ohio-water-system-opera-
tor-failed-to-notify-public-unsafe-lead-levels; M.B. Pell & Joshua Schneyer, The Thousands of
U.S. Locales Where Lead Poisoning Is Worse than in Flint, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www
.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-lead-testing/.  Nor is unsafe water the only
problem that America’s crumbling infrastructure poses.
349 Robert Glennon, America’s Water Supply: The Corrosion of a Proud Tradition, SCI. AM.
(Aug. 29, 2016), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/america-s-water-supply-
the-corrosion-of-a-proud-tradition/; see also Erik Olson, Common Tap Water Contaminants:
Health Effects, Treatment, and Recommendations, in WHAT’S ON TAP? GRADING DRINKING
WATER IN U.S. CITIES (Dana Nadel Foley ed., 2003), http://www.nrdc.org/water/drink-
ing/uscities/pdf/whatsontap.pdf (discussing multiple threats to clean water); OLSON &
FEDINICK, supra note 345; Cara Cunningham Warren, An American Reset—Safe Water & a
Workable Model of Federalism, 27 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 51, 53 (2016) (arguing that the
Flint crisis is not unique, and “reveals a pernicious problem with our current federalism
model . . . : we are relying on an increasingly inappropriate power structure to guarantee
the safety of our water supply, one that places the heaviest burden on the least powerful
actor—the water supplier”).
350 Corey Williams, Detroit Schools Struggle to Solve Huge Budget Woes, DESERET NEWS (Mar.
20, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700120043/Detroit-schools-struggle-to-
solve-huge-budget-woes.html?pg=all.
351 See Anderson, supra note 323.
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One may respond that the more routine and widespread such defaults
become, the harder it will be for judges to deem the government actions
shocking or targeted at any particular community.  The bigger the dilemma,
the less courts may seem to be the right institution to impose a particular
policy outcome nationwide and to monitor government progress.  Also, these
widespread harms may further undermine any constitutional argument that
requires a showing of specific intent to harm a particular group of people.
We recognize that fixing bad water pipes, like fixing bad roads and other
aspects of crumbling infrastructure, is better suited to nonjudicial reme-
dies.352  The liberty baseline defined here is no panacea; by itself, it will not
fix Flint or the nation.  But without it, too little may stand between grossly
inept government conduct and grave, remediless environmental harms.
Moreover, to indict the shocks the conscience test on the ground that
judicial remedies may be anemic reaches too far.  The same concern would
doom constitutional remedies across a wide swath of liberty and equality con-
cerns which have similar structural features, and which may be redressed by a
combination of judicial, administrative, and legislative means.  Constitutional
arguments should be one sharp arrow in the liberty/equality quiver, not the
whole set.
None of this, of course, is lost on thoughtful environmental lawyers and
activists, on some elected officials, policymakers, judges, scientists, econo-
mists, business people, or even on most average citizens.  They realize that
nobody is insulated from hemorrhaging environmental disasters, past or
impending, and that a host of steps must be taken to mitigate or avert them.
And as to water quality in particular, the EPA published a Drinking Water
Action Plan in late November 2016 that shows national resolve to do more to
assure this basic need is met.353
Multipronged steps also are being considered in Michigan, and include
establishing clean drinking water as a human right.354  Proposed Michigan
legislation would have the state adopt the strictest lead testing rules in the
nation.355
As noted earlier, other states are likewise taking action to assure a right
to environmental quality beyond what national constitutional law requires.356
352 For an examination of the complexities of financing infrastructures, and the nega-
tive externalities infrastructure projects may impose, see INGO WALTER, WORKING GROUP
ON INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., THE INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE CHALLENGE (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841281.
353 EPA, DRINKING WATER ACTION PLAN (Nov. 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/pro-
duction/files/2016-11/documents/
508.final_.usepa_.drinking.water_.action.plan_11.30.16.v0.pdf.
354 Human Right to Water Act, H.B. 5101 (Mich. 2015); Human Right to Water Act,
S.B. 643 (Mich. 2015).
355 See Michigan Proposes Adopting Strictest Lead-Testing Rules in Country, REUTERS (Apr. 15,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-water-idUSKCN0XC1W1.
356 See supra text accompanying note 276.
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Thus, signs have emerged that the urgency of environmental protection can
prompt significant and dramatic government responses.357
There also are promising signs that some policymakers will continue to
advance environmental safety interventions and remedies that are context
and culture sensitive,358 and thus more effective and humane.  Important
work is being done to assure that environmental policy before and after
harmful incidents takes into account the complexities of local, especially cul-
tural, aspects of environmental justice.359
357 Those who fear liberty, economic, or other boomerang aspects of environmental
regulation but appreciate the need for action may also favor legal measures that stop short
of commands.  Measures can incentivize better environmental practices with nudges and
other means.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE
AGE OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 159–86 (2016) (discussing the use of externality-reducing
nudges rather than mandates in the environmental context, and noting that they are no
panacea: among other things, they may impose disparate costs on poorer individuals).
358 See, e.g., proposed Senate Bill 2848, which states in section 7108 as follows: “The
Administrator [of the EPA] shall appoint not fewer than 1 employee in each regional
office of the Environmental Protection Agency to serve as a liaison to minority, tribal, and
low-income communities in the relevant region.”  Water Resources Development Act of
2016, S. 2848, 114th Cong. § 7404 (2016); see also Federal Actions to Address Environmen-
tal Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898,
59 Fed. Reg. 32,7629 (Feb. 16, 1994) (requiring federal agencies to make environmental
justice part of their missions, as feasible).  Of course, the status of these and other environ-
mental policies at the federal level is uncertain under the new administration.
359 For example, policymakers and judges may learn much from work being done in
the wake of a 2015 acid mine drainage spill in Colorado.  During an EPA investigation of
the Gold King Mine, approximately three million gallons of acid mine drainage were
accidently released. See Karletta Chief et al., K’e´ bee da’ahı´ı´nı´ı´ta: Strength Through the Dine´
(Navajo) Clan System to Respond to the Gold King Mine Spill, University of Arizona Foun-
dation Agnese Nelms Haury Program in Environmental and Social Justice Challenge Grant
(Apr. 4, 2016) (on file with authors).  The spill flowed into the Animas and San Juan Rivers
and contained high concentrations of metals, such as lead and arsenic. Id.  The effects
involved the waterways of twelve Indian tribes and six states in the Colorado River Basin.
Id.  Some of the early responses to the disaster focused myopically on recreational users of
these waterways and ignored that tribes subsisted on the water. Id.  An interdisciplinary
team of researchers, working with major funding from the Agnes Nelms Haury Program in
Environmental and Social Justice, has reached out to the tribes to teach tribal health lead-
ers about water quality testing and other means of mitigating the disastrous effects of the
spill in ways that are attuned to tribal customs, languages, and ways of life. Id.  Their work
may produce a national model of how to make environmental interventions a more effec-
tive and just means of preventing and responding to environmental harms. Id.; see also
PICTOU LANDING NATIVE WOMEN’S GROUP ET AL., ‘OUR ANCESTORS ARE IN OUR LAND,
WATER, AND AIR’: A TWO-EYED SEEING APPROACH TO RESEARCHING ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
CONCERNS WITH PICTOU LANDING FIRST NATION (2016).  Although the Gold King Mine spill
may have been one of the largest in recent history, the Department of Interior estimates
that there are more than 500,000 abandoned mines throughout the United States.
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., ABANDONED MINES: EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM, http://www.aban
donedmines.gov/extent_of_the_problem (last visited Aug. 23, 2017).  Consequently, there
is high potential for ongoing acid mine leaks or future large-scale spills. Id.
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Finally, advances in technology and science can improve prevention and
enforcement.360  Interdisciplinary work is critical to designing effective poli-
cies in this increasingly vital area of global, national, and local concern.361
We do not purport here to outline all of the relevant concerns, or imag-
ine we can map out all of the possible extralegal and legal measures that
might be mobilized to respond to Flint and other unfolding environmental
crises.  Grasping and solving the public/private coordination, economic, sci-
entific, technological, and human justice barriers to assuring uncontami-
nated water and a safe environment in other respects obviously are
profoundly challenging concerns.  A district judge in Michigan (or else-
where) cannot be expected to solve this puzzle alone.
Our claim is this: the complexities of multiheaded strategies should not
rule out properly calibrated judicial responses, including constitutional
responses, to environmental disasters.  Everything that makes crafting sound
and humane environmental policy an inherently complex and multidiscipli-
nary endeavor applies equally to crafting sound and humane economic, edu-
cational, health, and other policy.  Judges can and should play a role in these
policy matters, as all have constitutional liberty and equality dimensions.
Environmental policy is no different in these respects.
CONCLUSION
Flint is a tragic, ongoing story that should teach this constitutional moral:
government shall not ignore basic human liberty and equality in ways that
shock the conscience.  Baseline constitutional protections include this sub-
stantive due process shield.
We have outlined here how this baseline may be implemented and have
underscored the normative reasons for a court to do so.  We have not con-
demned thicker rights strategies in such cases, but regard the baseline liberty
approach as more feasible and a descriptively compelling judicial response to
shocking environmental disasters.  By applying the latter test, courts can give
constitutional voice to liberty and equality losses like the ones suffered by
Flint residents, and can signal to the nation that courts can and will respond
forcefully and meaningfully to the outrage these losses properly evoke.
360 See generally Robert L. Glicksman et al., Technological Innovation, Data Analytics, and
Environmental Enforcement, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 41 (2017) (noting that information technology
may improve understanding of the state of environmental compliance and thus promote
compliance through the combined efforts of government, regulated entities, and civil
society).
361 See, e.g., MICHAEL E. WEBBER, THIRST FOR POWER: ENERGY, WATER, AND HUMAN SUR-
VIVAL (2016).
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